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Solutions de Sécurité de Couche Physique Contre les Récepteurs Indistincts Passifs et
Complexes dans les Grands Réseaux sans Fil et les Environnements à Bruit Impulsif
Michael ATALLAH
RÉSUMÉ
Les réseaux sans ﬁl ont connu des évolutions rapides vers la durabilité, l’évolutivité et l’interop-
érabilité. Les sociétés en réseau futures conduisent l’économie numérique à une commu-
nauté plus globale d’infrastructures intelligentes et de services connectés pour une société plus
durable et plus intelligente. En outre, une énorme quantité d’informations sensibles et conﬁ-
dentielles, telles que les dossiers médicaux, les supports électroniques, les données ﬁnancières
et les ﬁchiers des clients, est transmise via des canaux sans ﬁl. La mise en œuvre de la distri-
bution et de la gestion des clés de couche supérieure a été mise au déﬁ par l’émergence de ces
nouveaux systèmes avancés. Aﬁn de résister à divers abus malveillants et attaques de sécurité,
la sécurité de couche physique (PLS) est devenue une alternative attrayante. Le concept de
base derrière PLS est d’exploiter les caractéristiques des canaux sans ﬁl pour la conﬁdentialité.
Son objectif est d’aveugler les oreilles indiscrètes de sorte qu’ils ne puissent en extraire au-
cune informations conﬁdentielles des signaux reçus. Cette thèse présente des solutions et des
analyses pour améliorer le PLS dans les réseaux sans ﬁl.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinons les performances de capacité de conﬁdentialité
d’un réseau à double saut ampliﬁer et transférer (AF) pour les techniques de formation de
faisceau réparti (DBF) et de relais opportuniste (OR). Nous calculons la capacité de mise
à l’échelle pour deux grands ensembles; des relais ﬁables et des relais agressifs peu ﬁables
coopérant avec un dépisteur visant à intercepter le message. Nous montrons que l’échelle de
capacité dans le DBF est délimitée par une valeur qui dépend du rapport entre le nombre de
relais agressifs dignes de conﬁance et ceux qui ne le sont pas, alors que la mise à l’échelle de
la capacité de OU est limitée dans le haut par une valeur qui dépend du nombre de relais ainsi
que du rapport signal sur bruit (SNR).
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous proposons une nouvelle technique de multidiffusion par local-
isation, destinée aux grands réseaux AF bi-phase, qui vise à améliorer la sécurité en présence
d’écoutes indiscrètes passives non-collupères. Nous démontrons analytiquement que la tech-
nique proposée augmente la sécurité en réduisant la probabilité de re-choisir un secteur qui a
des oreilles indiscrètes, pour chaque temps de transmission. De plus, nous montrons également
que la capacité de conﬁdentialité de notre technique est la même que pour la radiodiffusion.
Ci-après, les limites inférieure et supérieure de la probabilité de défaillance du secret sont cal-
culées et il est montré que les performances de sécurité sont remarquablement améliorées par
rapport à la technique de multidiffusion classique.
Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous proposons un nouveau protocole de coopération pour les
réseaux de capteurs sans ﬁl à ampliﬁcation et transmission doubles à phase double, visant à
améliorer la sécurité de la transmission tout en tenant compte des capacités limitées des nœuds
de capteurs. Dans un tel réseau, une partie des K relais peut être de potentiels oreilles indis-
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crètes passives. Pour réduire l’impact de ces relais non ﬁables sur la sécurité du réseau, nous
proposons un nouveau protocole de transmission, dans lequel la source accepte de partager avec
la destination une information CSI (Channel State Information) donnée de source sécurisée
lien relais-destination pour encoder le message. Ensuite, la source utilisera à nouveau cette
CSI pour mapper le bon message sur un certain secteur tout en transmettant de faux messages
aux autres secteurs. L’adoption d’un tel protocole de sécurité est prometteuse en raison de la
disponibilité d’un grand nombre de capteurs électroniques bon marché dotés de capacités de
calcul limitées. Pour le schéma proposé, nous avons dérivé la probabilité de coupure du secret
(SOP) et démontré que la probabilité de recevoir les informations codées à droite par un relais
peu ﬁable sont inversement proportionnelles au nombre de secteurs. Nous montrons également
que le comportement agressif des relais non ﬁables coopérants n’est pas efﬁcace par rapport au
cas où chaque relais non sécurisé tente d’intercepter individuellement le message transmis.
Enﬁn, nous examinons les performances de sécurité de la couche physique sur les canaux à
évanouissements de Rayleigh en présence de bruit impulsif, telles que rencontrées par exemple
dans les environnements de électrique intelligent. Pour ce schéma, les métriques de perfor-
mance de conﬁdentialité ont été prises en compte avec et sans brouillage assisté par destination
du côté de l’espionneur. D’après les résultats obtenus, il est vériﬁé que la POS, sans brouillage
assisté par destination, est un revêtement de sol avec un rapport signal sur bruit élevé valeurs
et qu’il peut être considérablement amélioré avec l’utilisation du brouillage.
Mots-clés: Couche physique, brouillage, transmission sectorielle, bruit impulsif.
Physical Layer Security Solutions Against Passive and Colluding Eavesdroppers in
Large Wireless Networks and Impulsive Noise Environments
Michael ATALLAH
ABSTRACT
Wireless networks have experienced rapid evolutions toward sustainability, scalability and in-
teroperability. The digital economy is driven by future networked societies to a more holistic
community of intelligent infrastructures and connected services for a more sustainable and
smarter society. Furthermore, an enormous amount of sensitive and conﬁdential information,
e.g., medical records, electronic media, ﬁnancial data, and customer ﬁles, is transmitted via
wireless channels. The implementation of higher layer key distribution and management was
challenged by the emergence of these new advanced systems. In order to resist various ma-
licious abuses and security attacks, physical layer security (PLS) has become an appealing
alternative. The basic concept behind PLS is to exploit the characteristics of wireless channels
for the conﬁdentiality. Its target is to blind the eavesdroppers such that they cannot extract any
conﬁdential information from the received signals. This thesis presents solutions and analyses
to improve the PLS in wireless networks.
In the second chapter, we investigate the secrecy capacity performance of an amplify-and-
forward (AF) dual-hop network for both distributed beamforming (DBF) and opportunistic
relaying (OR) techniques. We derive the capacity scaling for two large sets; trustworthy relays
and untrustworthy aggressive relays cooperating together with a wire-tapper aiming to intercept
the message. We show that the capacity scaling in the DBF is lower bounded by a value which
depends on the ratio between the number of the trustworthy and the untrustworthy aggressive
relays, whereas the capacity scaling of OR is upper bounded by a value depending on the
number of relays as well as the signal to noise ratio (SNR).
In the third chapter, we propose a new location-based multicasting technique, for dual phase
AF large networks, aiming to improve the security in the presence of non-colluding passive
eavesdroppers. We analytically demonstrate that the proposed technique increases the security
by decreasing the probability of re-choosing a sector that has eavesdroppers, for each trans-
mission time. Moreover, we also show that the secrecy capacity scaling of our technique is the
same as for broadcasting. Hereafter, the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy outage prob-
ability are calculated, and it is shown that the security performance is remarkably enhanced,
compared to the conventional multicasting technique.
In the fourth chapter, we propose a new cooperative protocol, for dual phase amplify-and-
forward large wireless sensor networks, aiming to improve the transmission security while
taking into account the limited capabilities of the sensor nodes. In such a network, a portion of
the K relays can be potential passive eavesdroppers. To reduce the impact of these untrustwor-
thy relays on the network security, we propose a new transmission protocol, where the source
agrees to share with the destination a given channel state information (CSI) of source-trusted
relay-destination link to encode the message. Then, the source will use this CSI again to map
Xthe right message to a certain sector while transmitting fake messages to the other sectors.
Adopting such a security protocol is promising because of the availability of a high number
of cheap electronic sensors with limited computational capabilities. For the proposed scheme,
we derived the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and demonstrated that the probability of re-
ceiving the right encoded information by an untrustworthy relay is inversely proportional to
the number of sectors. We also show that the aggressive behavior of cooperating untrusted
relays is not effective compared to the case where each untrusted relay is trying to intercept the
transmitted message individually.
Fifth and last, we investigate the physical layer security performance over Rayleigh fading
channels in the presence of impulsive noise, as encountered, for instance, in smart grid envi-
ronments. For this scheme, secrecy performance metrics were considered with and without
destination assisted jamming at the eavesdropper’s side. From the obtained results, it is veri-
ﬁed that the SOP, without destination assisted jamming, is ﬂooring at high signal-to-noise-ratio
values and that it can be signiﬁcantly improved with the use of jamming.
Keywords: Physical Layer, Jamming, Sectoral Transmission, Impulsive Noise.
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INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is an integral part of our lives; it also has signiﬁcant social repercus-
sions. Privacy and conﬁdentiality with respect to the transmitted information over the wireless
medium is vital, especially for applications concerning medical information, e-banking, and
e-commerce. However, wireless communications are often vulnerable to eavesdropping and
signal interception Mavoungou et al. (2016); Neshenko et al. (2019); Hong et al. (2013). Many
security requirements are considered in the design of wireless networks, like integrity, conﬁ-
dentiality checks, authentication and spectrum access control Lou & Ren (2009); Shiu et al.
(2011). Integrity ensures that the information that has been transmitted is utilized and modiﬁed
by the legitimate user. Conﬁdentiality refers to the prevention of unauthorized information dis-
closure. Authentication refers to the individuality of different terminals’ conﬁrmations. Spec-
trum access control refers to the prevention of denial-of-service type attacks. Usually, these
security tasks are mostly undertaken in the protocol stack of the network’s upper layers with
the usage of cryptographic encryption and decryption methods. When employing symmetric-
key cryptosystems, the two users have to share a common private key that is encrypting and
decrypting the private message Hong et al. (2013). However, this requires a secure channel
or protocol for the secret keys sharing. The secret key management and distribution has its
own difﬁculties Schneier (1998); they lead to security vulnerabilities in wireless systems. As
a substitute, the cryptosystems of the public key allow the use of two different keys; a public
one for encryption and a separate private one for decryption. The ﬁrst one is also available to
all users since the private key is only known by the receiver. Therefore, cryptographic methods
rely on the hardness of the computation to decrypt the message to achieve security when there
is no availability of the secret key. As the computation power increases, e.g., with the devel-
opment of quantum computers, the computational hardness of some mathematical problems,
which is the basis of the decryption and encryption, will not hold, resulting in many cryp-
tosystems’ break down Hong et al. (2013). Moreover, in future networks, more devices will
2be connected to nodes with different power and computational capabilities. Furthermore, due
to the decentralized nature of the networks, devices join or leave the network in random time
instants, which renders the management and distribution of cryptographic keys a challenging
task. Therefore, many signal and coding processing techniques have been developed in the
physical layer to enhance and to support security in wireless systems. Many contributions have
been made to ﬁnd alternative security solutions to ﬁt the requirements of current and emerging
wireless networks Goel & Negi (2008); Gopala et al. (2008); Shannon (1949); Bloch & Bar-
ros (2011). Therefore, the security of the physical layer can facilitate the cryptographic keys’
distribution to enhance the security. Even though the fast variations of the channel and the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium may cause additional challenges to their design, the
physical layer security techniques also exploit the wireless transmissions’ properties to better
protect the communication channel Hong et al. (2013).
Contributions and Outline
The ﬁrst chapter is the literature review that browses brieﬂy the applied security techniques in
the physical layer. The contributions of our thesis are summerized as follows:
In Chapter 2, the secrecy capacity scaling was investigated in the presence of untrustworthy
aggressive relays that are cooperating between each other to intercept the message. More-
over, destination assisted jamming was applied. Two transmission strategies were studied:
opportunistic relaying and distributed beamforming techniques. The secrecy scaling bounds
were calculated for both DBF and OR. For DBF, it is shown that its secrecy scaling is lower
bounded by a value related to the number of the trustworthy and the untrustworthy relays in the
network, and that intended jamming, when applied, remarkably enhances the security. More-
over, the DBF showed better security performance compared to OR, which gives DBF the
priority to be applied in large wireless networks when the security is demanded.
3In Chapter 3, to reduce the probability that an eavesdropper would have a continuous access to
the transmitted message, the legitimate transmitter decided to change its transmission from
broadcasting to a location-based multicasting technique, in the presence of destination as-
sisted jamming. In this way, if it is not in the covered sector, the eavesdropper cannot access
the transmitted message. The secrecy capacity scaling was calculated and showed that this
location-based multicasting technique scales similar to the broadcasting one. Moreover, ana-
lytical expressions of the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy outage probability were also
provided. The proposed protocol was shown to be secure and confusing to the eavesdropper
since the later cannot have access to the transmitted information all the time.
Chapter 4 proposes a novel protocol that implements the location-based multicasting protocol,
to transmit the useful information in one sector and fake information towards the other sectors.
The main advantage of this technique is its immunity towards the presence of aggressive relays
when they plan to cooperate between each other to intercept the message. The results showed
that this aggressive cooperation by the eavesdroppers will hardly increase the amount of the
stolen information. Also, it is proved that by increasing the number of multicasted sectors,
the security performance is enhanced. No jamming was applied in this scenario; however, the
performance of the proposed protocol overcomes the secrecy performance of the conventional
jamming technique.
In Chapter 5, new secrecy capacity expressions in the presence of impulsive noise and des-
tination assisted jamming are proposed. This new alternative approach in reformulating the
secrecy capacity expressions allows the other researchers to analyse their proposed system
models easily in the presence of impulsive noise. Analytical expressions for the secrecy outage
probability, with and without jamming, were provided. From the obtained results, it was shown
that the SOP without destination assisted jamming is ﬂooring at high SNR values, and that it
could be enhanced remarkably by adding destination assisted jamming techniques.
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CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Physical Layer Security Concept
As shown in Fig. 1.1, a generic wireless communication network model consisting of three
nodes, namely a legitimate transmitter (Alice), an intended receiver (Bob) and an eavesdropper
(Eve), is taken into consideration. We call the link between Alice and Bob the main channel,
while the link between Alice and Eve is called the wiretap channel. This model exempliﬁes the
speciﬁc features of most multi-user secure communication systems. The vital concept of the
secrecy capacity relies on goal of maximizing the legitimate channel capacity or minimizing
the capacity of the illegitimate channels, which is attainable via the usage of the dynamic
nature of the wireless channels, otherwise it is equal to zero Gopala et al. (2008). In Bloch
et al. (2008), the secrecy capacity over an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channelCs,A
and Rayleigh fading channel Cs,R are respectively given by
Cs,A =
[
1
2
log2
(
1+
P
σ2m
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1+
P
σ2w
)]+
, (1.1)
Cs,R =
[
log2
(
1+
P|hm|2
σ2m
)
− log2
(
1+
P|hw|2
σ2w
)]+
, (1.2)
where [x]+ =max{0,x}, P represents the transmitted power, σ2m and σ2w are the noise power of
the main channel and wiretap channel, respectively. Moreover, hm and hw are the instantaneous
channel coefﬁcients of the main channel and wiretap channel, respectively. Also, the received
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at Bob and Eve are deﬁned as γm = P|hm|
2
σ2m
and γw = P|hw|
2
σ2w
, re-
spectively. To achieve security, our aim is to keep the secrecy capacity Cs strictly positive, i.e.
Cs > 0. In Fig. 1.2, the average secrecy capacity of a Rayleigh fading channel (1.2) is compared
with that of a Gaussian wiretap channel (1.1). Strikingly, one can observe that the secrecy ca-
pacity over Rayleigh fading channels is higher than over AWGN channels. In other words, we
can use the fading property of the physical layer to decrease the SNR of the wiretap channel.
6Figure 1.1 Wireless wiretap system model
Besides using the fading characteristics of the wireless channel, many other methods to im-
prove the secrecy performance of the wireless communication systems have been suggested.
In Shiu et al. (2011), physical layer security methods are classiﬁed into ﬁve major approaches:
multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) channel, theoretical secrecy capacity, coding schemes
(channel coding and network coding), power allocation, and signal design (artiﬁcial noise).
Additionally, cooperative relay Han et al. (2015); Wang et al. (2013a); Chen et al. (2013),
cooperative jamming Atallah et al. (2015); Ibrahim et al. (2015); Jameel et al. (2018), inter-
leaving and spreading in frequency and time to secure Multi-Carrier Differential Chaos Shift
Keying (MC-DCSK) Kaddoum et al. (2012) and energy harvesting Xing et al. (2014) are other
useful methods. In the following section, we will describe the widely used methods in physical
layer security.
1.2 Physical Layer Security Techniques
In this section, we will explore the most commonly used techniques to enhance the security in
the physical layer.
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Figure 1.2 Normalized average secrecy capacity versus γm, for
chosen values of γw, in Rayleigh and Gaussian wiretap channels
1.2.1 Artiﬁcial Noise and Artiﬁcial Fading
A. Artiﬁcial Noise
In multi-antenna systems, Artiﬁcial noise is one of the most popular techniques to guarantee
security at the physical layer Goel & Negi (2008); Khisti & Wornell (2010). The basic idea
behind artiﬁcial noise technique is that the channel state information (CSI) of the main channel
is unknown by the eavesdroppers. Thus, they will be distracted and unable to decode the
8transmitted information-bearing symbols. In Fig. 1.1, the source sends its signal
x= u+ v, (1.3)
where u is the message and v is the added artiﬁcial noise. v is chosen such that hm v= 0. Then,
the signal received by the legitimate receiver Bob is
yb = hm x+nb = hm(u+ v)+nb
yb = hmu+nb,
(1.4)
whereas the signal received by the eavesdropper Eve is
ye = hw x+ne = hw u+hw v+ne
ye = hw u+hw v+ne,
(1.5)
hence, the secrecy capacity is obtained as
Cs =
[
log2
(
1+ Pu
|hm|2
σ2b
)
− log2
(
1+ Pu
|hw|2
Pv |hw|2+σ2e
)]+
, (1.6)
where Pu and Pv are the transmitted power of u and v respectively, σ2b and σ
2
e are the noise
power at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. hm and hw are the channel
coefﬁcients of the main and wiretap links, respectively. We can see from (1.6) that the secrecy
capacity is improved by adding the artiﬁcial noise compared to (1.2). The authors in Lin et al.
(2013b) proposed a generalized scheme for injecting artiﬁcial noise to a legitimate channel.
Their scheme was shown to be efﬁcient under various channel conditions. Their simulation
results showed that their algorithm outperforms other previous algorithms in enhancing the
secrecy capacity. In Zhang et al. (2016b), an efﬁcient algorithm was proposed to study the op-
timal resource allocation for maximizing the weighted sum secrecy rate with a new frequency
domain artiﬁcial noise aided transmission strategy. Also, in Zeng et al. (2019), the authors pro-
posed a strategy to secure the conﬁdential information of massive MIMO-NOMA networks,
9where the base station, based on the estimated CSI, precodes the conﬁdential information and
injects artiﬁcial noise.
B. Artiﬁcial Fading
Different from the artiﬁcial noise, the main idea of artiﬁcial fading is to weight the transmitted
information symbol s randomly by a weighting coefﬁcient k. The transmitted signal could be
written as
x= ks, (1.7)
with a constraint that hmk = 1, where hm is the channel coefﬁcient between the transmitter and
the legitimate receiver. Therefore, the received signal at the legitimate receiver becomes
ym = hmks+nm = s+nm, (1.8)
where nm is the AWGN at the receiver. Therefore, the receiver will be able to decode its
received signal directly without any channel coefﬁcient hm, whereas the signal received at the
eavesdropper becomes
yw = hwks+nw, (1.9)
where hw is the channel coefﬁcient between the transmitter and the eavesdropper, and nw is the
AWGN at the eavesdropper. The authors in Wang et al. (2015c) compared between artiﬁcial
noise and artiﬁcial time-varying multiplicative noise that they named it artiﬁcial fast fading
scheme since this scheme results in an equivalent fast fading channel for the eavesdropper.
They concluded that the artiﬁcial noise scheme achieves a larger secrecy rate when the trans-
mitter has more antennas than the eavesdropper. Otherwise the artiﬁcial fast fading is superior.
Motivated by their results, they proposed a hybrid artiﬁcial noise-artiﬁcial fast fading scheme
to achieve a better secrecy performance than either schemes. As mentioned in Wang & Yang
(2012), the unwanted wireless communication links can deliberately be corrupted by double
beam switching of the smart antenna array as a novel concept of artiﬁcial fading. In Wang
et al. (2014a), artiﬁcial fast fading was applied by randomly weighting the information sym-
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bols at different transmitting antennas in a special way so that the eavesdropper’s channel is
a fast fading channel while that of the intended receiver is an additive white Gaussian noise
channel. In Song (2018), the researchers proposed a novel cross layer design by combining ar-
tiﬁcial fast fading with secret-keys in the upper layer crypto-system to nullify the information
leakage for any number of antennas at the eavesdropper. For both artiﬁcial noise and artiﬁcial
fading, it is assumed that the transmitter and the receiver are acquainted of the main channel.
Subsequently, the legitimate channel’s security performance becomes easily assailable by the
eavesdropper. Moreover, the mobility of the legitimate nodes, with the artiﬁcial noise and arti-
ﬁcial fading techniques, which adds complexity due to the rapid changes in the characteristics
of the legitimate channels, has not yet been investigated.
1.2.2 Spooﬁng
Figure 1.3 The spoofer is transmitting a deceiving signal to a
legitimate receiver
In wireless networks, a spooﬁng attack, depicted in Fig.1.3, is a situation in which a node
transmits deceiving signals to a legitimate receiver by acting as if it is a legitimate transmitter.
Spooﬁng attacks studies have investigated the detection of the spoofers’ location, which can be
done by measuring the received signal strength (RSS) transmitted by the attacker. Mathemati-
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cally, RSS is given by
RSS(dB) = Ptx+ρ −PL, (1.10)
where Ptx is the transmitted power, PL is the path loss and ρ is the gain of the transmitting
antenna. To locate the spoofer, many receivers should work collaboratively to measure the
RSSs Wang & Yang (2013). Another way to estimate the spoofer’s location is by measuring
the angle of the arrived signal Chen et al. (2012), this method is more accurate than the former
one Wang & Yang (2013). In Liu et al. (2019), the authors proposed a new pilot spooﬁng
attack detection scheme by employing another node as a trusted user, which also cooperates
in the uplink training process and helps to detect pilot spooﬁng in multiple-input single-output
(MISO) systems. Also, to prevent spooﬁng attacks, ﬁnger prints or link signatures are used
as useful methods Zhang et al. (2008). Link signature is extracted from the channel impulse
response as a function of time delay and the magnitude of the impulse response. By applying
the latter, the legitimate nodes are able to distinguish each other since the channels between
them are identiﬁed and are well known between them. Therefore, being in a different location,
a spoofer could be easily detected from the link signature of its channel. The weakness of the
link signature method lies in the complexity of the key signature calculation at the legitimate
nodes when they are changing their locations. Essentially, the available work in this particular
ﬁeld has mainly focused on locating the spoofers. Therefore, to establish a protocol on how
to protect the legitimate nodes or even attack the spoofers, further work needs to be done.
Very few works studied the mobility of the legitimate nodes in the context of spooﬁng attacks.
Consequently, an investigation is needed in this ﬁeld to provide a certain level of security when
nodes are moving or for fast varying channel conditions.
1.2.3 Multi Antenna and Beamforming Based Techniques
To enhance the security in the physical layer, multiple antenna techniques are widely ap-
plied Yang et al. (2013); Zhang et al. (2015); Li et al. (2014a); Wang et al. (2014b); Ba-
nawan & Ulukus (2014); Xing et al. (2014); Vishwakarma & Chockalingam (2014); Og-
gier & Hassibi (2011). Fig 1.4 shows a general MIMO wiretap channel, where the source,
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Figure 1.4 Representation of a general MIMO wiretap channel
destination, and wiretapper are equipped with n, nm and nw antennas, respectively. The source
transmits an n×1 complex transmitted signal X with covariance matrix Kx = E{XXH}, satis-
fying the power constraint Tr(Kx)≤ P. Therefore, the signals received by the destination and
the wiretapper are
Ym = HmX+Nm, (1.11)
and
Yw = HwX+Nw, (1.12)
respectively, where Nm and Nw are respectively nm×1 and nw×1 complex white Gaussian
additive noise vectors. Therefore, the secrecy capacity of MIMO wiretap channels is given in
Oggier & Hassibi (2011) by
CS = max
Kx≥0,Tr(Kx)=P
logdet(I+HmKxHHm)− logdet(I+HwKxHHw ) (1.13)
where Hm and Hw are respectively nm×n and nw×n ﬁxed channel matrices. Moreover, (.)H
is the Hermitian and I denotes the identity matrix. It is clear from (1.13) that the secrecy
capacity is enhanced by increasing the numbers of antennas at the destination. The secrecy
performance of MIMO wiretap channels was analysed in Kong et al. (2016) and Kong et al.
(2018a). The authors in Yang et al. (2013) assumed a scenario where multiple legitimate users
13
are receiving multiple independent data streams from a base station; during the transmission,
many eavesdroppers with multiple antennas are interested in the transmission stream of the
base station. Colluding or not, the eavesdroppers may also use receiving beamforming method
to maximize the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the streams they are wire-
tapping. To guarantee a conﬁdential transmission between the legitimate users and the base
station, the cooperative jammer will work on keeping the SINR at the eavesdroppers below
a certain threshold level. Another scenario in Li et al. (2014a) studied the Gaussian wiretap
channel’s secrecy capacity aided by an external jammer. While the jammer and the eaves-
dropper are equipped with multiple antennas, each of the receiver and the transmitter have a
single one. The authors in Wang et al. (2014b) revealed a scenario for secure transmission
within a two-hop amplify-and-forward relay network scheme, such that for a large number of
antennas, the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) is independent of the number of antennas at the
source and dependent on the number of antennas at the destination. In Kong et al. (2018b),
the analysis of the secrecy performance in MIMO wireless networks was provided for two
schemes: the nearest user and the best user based on its SNR. The researchers in Tran et al.
(2019) proposed two transmit antenna selection solutions in MIMO NOMA networks. Their
study showed that increasing the number of antennas at the legitimate nodes only has an impact
on low and medium range of transmitted SNR values. Beamforming, a technique used to direct
the signal transmission or reception, is also an efﬁcient method and it is applied in many works
with the cooperative jamming technique Wang et al. (2013a); Tran & Kong (2014); Wang et al.
(2013b); Han et al. (2015); Vishwakarma & Chockalingam (2014). In Wang et al. (2013a), a
scheme with joint cooperative jamming and beamforming was proposed to raise the security
level of a cooperative relay network, where part of the nodes use a distributed beamforming
mechanism while the others are simultaneously jamming the eavesdropper. In Tran & Kong
(2014), another beamforming scheme was proposed; by preventing the eavesdroppers from us-
ing the beamformers to suppress the jamming signals. It also uses two orthogonal dimensions
for transmitting and receiving signals. Moreover, a hybrid cooperative jamming and beam-
forming scheme was proposed in Wang et al. (2013b) also; the idea behind this work is that in
both hops of a cooperative transmission, some intermediate nodes relay the signals to the legit-
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imate receivers by adopting the beamforming distribution, while the other nodes are jamming
the eavesdropper, which eventually leads in protection of the transmitted data. The authors
in Han et al. (2015) developed an optimal relay assignment algorithm to solve a problem to
maximize secrecy capacity, and an algorithm on smart jamming was also proposed to increase
the system’s secrecy capacity. In Alsaba et al. (2019), the authors studied a null-steering beam-
forming technique to enhance the security in NOMA systems by injecting a jamming signal
and directing it toward the malicious node while being suppressed in the direction of the le-
gitimate users. Also, the researchers in Akhlaghpasand et al. (2019) proposed a framework
to protect the uplink transmission from jamming attacks in massive MIMO systems by sup-
pressing the jamming interference during the detection of the useful information sent by the
legitimate users. However, one of the challenges in beamforming is when the nodes are mov-
ing, which makes it difﬁcult to track and direct the beams towards these nodes, besides that
when working in high frequencies, these beams could be easily blocked, even by hand.
1.2.4 Relay and Cooperative Methods
In the context of relay networks, we can divide the security issues in two broad categories,
namely trusted relays and untrusted relays.
A. Trusted Relays:
The eavesdropper and the relays are two separated network entities. Fig. 1.5 shows one of
the most frequently used relay-based wiretap scenarios. To counteract external eavesdroppers,
the relays can play various roles. They may be acting as traditional relays or both jamming
partners as well as relaying components in order to strengthen the secure transmission. The
concept of trusted relays was used in Arafa et al. (2018) to secure downlink NOMA systems.
In Atallah & Kaddoum (2019), the source and the destination share the CSI of source-trusted
relay-destination link to encode the messages and to map the transmission. The authors in
Dahmane et al. (2017) introduced a weighted probabilistic and trust-aware strategy to provide
high security and integrity level with less relays. In addition, in Waqas et al. (2018), secret key
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Figure 1.5 Representation of trusted (distinct relay and eavesdropper)
relay network
generation was investigated in D2D communications in the presence of trusted and untrusted
relays. Another novel noise-forwarding strategy called deaf helper phenomenon was also pro-
posed in Lai & El Gamal (2008); to confuse the eavesdropper, dummy codewords independent
of the secret message are sent by the full-duplex relays. This strategy was also investigated in
Bassily & Ulukus (2013, 2012). In Li et al. (2013), a security-oriented transmission scheme
was proposed in cognitive radio network CRN with the aid of multiple relays. To maximize
the secondary user (SU) link secrecy capacity, both cooperative jamming techniques and beam-
forming are used to improve the performance of the SU while providing a good protection to
the primary users (PUs). The proposed scheme contributes in securing the SU’s transmission
while the SNR attenuation at the PU receiver is kept acceptable. Another interesting security
scheme, in a centralized cognitive radio network (CRN), was proposed in Wen et al. (2019),
where the base station is communicating with a PU in the presence of an eavesdropper, while
the SU acts as a friendly jammer. This jammer could be fully trusted or untrusted when it does
not send jamming signals all the time for selﬁsh reasons. Therefore, a selection criterion was
adopted to evaluate the trust degree of this jammer and its effect on the secrecy performance.
B. Untrusted Relays:
Unlike the aforementioned case, the relay itself is sometimes considered an untrusted user; it
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Figure 1.6 Representation of untrusted (co-located relay and eavesdropper)
relay network
acts both as an eavesdropper and a traditional relay, i.e., as shown in Fig. 1.6 the relay node and
the eavesdropper are co-locating. First studied in Oohama (2007) for general relay channels,
this type of model implies that the source desires to use the relay to communicate with the
destination while it intends to shield the relay of the message. Under the assumption that some
of the messages that have been transmitted are conﬁdential to the relay, coding problems asso-
ciated with the relay-wiretap channel are studied. In Shrestha et al. (2019), the authors studied
the secrecy performance of a multi-hop ad-hoc wireless network in the presence of untrusted
and trusted relays in each hop. To perform the transmission, the most secure relay will be
chosen in each hop to deliver the message. The researchers in El Shaﬁe et al. (2017) proposed
a new scheme to secure a wireless network in the presence of untrusted relays. The destina-
tion and another cooperative jammer inject artiﬁcial noise to jam these relays for two reasons;
to prevent them from intercepting their received messages and to help them harvest energy to
charge their batteries. In Atallah & Kaddoum (2017) and Atallah & Kaddoum (2019), new
location-based multicasting techniques were proposed to reduce the possibility of an untrust-
worthy relay intercepting the whole transmitted message. As an interesting result, the use of
an untrustworthy relay can still be beneﬁcial in increasing the secrecy capacity Yener & He
(2010); Jeong et al. (2012); Sun et al. (2012); Kuhestani et al. (2016). In the following section,
we will explore a very important cooperating method in physical layer security; the cooperative
jamming technique, which is a promising method and has attracted signiﬁcant attention. This
method was proposed originally for a multiple access wiretap channel, where multiple legiti-
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mate users wish to establish secure communications with an intended receiver in the presence
of an eavesdropper. Since an eavesdropper could be part of a wireless network as an untrusted
relay, we will explore here some major types of the eavesdroppers’ behaviors.
Active behavior:
Here, as an example, the eavesdropper could attack the wireless system by sending jamming
signals. In this case, it is possible to locate this active eavesdropper and change the current
strategies to avoid this type of attacks.
Passive behavior:
In this type, each eavesdropper will work individually to intercept the message, without doing
Figure 1.7 Eavesdroppers’ passive behavior
any action that could lead to detect its real identity or its place. Therefore, it’s hard to locate
this kind of eavesdroppers compared to the active one, Fig.1.7.
Colluding behavior:
For this type of behavior, the eavesdroppers will collude together to intercept the message,
by sending all their received signals towards another wiretapper. In the literature, this behavior
was called the colluding, cooperating or aggressive behavior, Fig1.8.
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Figure 1.8 Eavesdroppers’ colluding behavior
1.2.4.1 Cooperative Jamming
To confuse the eavesdropper, a special technique called cooperative jamming can be used where
an artiﬁcial noise is introduced by a helpful interferer. The secrecy performance analysis with
cooperative jamming was studied in the presence of the impulsive noise Atallah et al. (2019),
aggressive relays Atallah & Kaddoum (2016), mixture Gamma distribution Kong & Kaddoum
(2019), αμ fading channels Kong & Kaddoum (2019), Hybrid Millimeter Wave Networks
Vuppala et al. (2018) , and device-to-device (D2D)-enabled cellular networks Tolossa et al.
(2018). In the following section, we will introduce the cooperative jamming techniques which
are used to increase the physical layer security. To improve the secrecy capacity, we should
either increase the legitimate receiver’s SNR or decrease the eavesdropper’s SNR. A natural
approach to achieve the latter is to introduce interferers into the system, Fig. 1.9.
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Figure 1.9 Representation of a network with a jammer
1.2.4.2 Artiﬁcial Jamming Signals Types
Cooperative jamming relies on creating the interference at the eavesdropper’s side, many arti-
ﬁcial jamming signals are used and could be divided into four categories Long et al. (2014):
1. Gaussian noise: which is similar to additive noise at the receiver Atallah & Kaddoum
(2016, 2017); Atallah & Kaddoum (2019).
2. Jamming signals which are priory known at the legitimate receivers, and thus only impact
the eavesdropper’s performance. This type of signals is better than the previous one be-
cause the jamming signals don’t affect the legitimate receiver Long et al. (2013); Dong
et al. (2011).
3. Random codewords of a public codebook which is known by all the nodes including the
eavesdroppers, so the legitimate receiver has the ability to decode and cancel the jamming
signals, even though it requires a complicated self-interference cancellation receiver to
decode the codewords Pierrot & Bloch (2011).
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4. Useful signals for the other legitimate nodes; signals of multiple simultaneous source-
destination pairs Sheikholeslami et al. (2012), or signals of the invited cognitive radio
users Stanojev & Yener (2011) and Stanojev & Yener. (2011); this type is difﬁcult to apply
because of the change in the multiple transmission pairs.
5. Random fake signals that the legitimate transmitter sends to confuse the eavesdroppers.
The legitimate receiver uses self-interference cancellation to cancel these fake messages
Atallah & Kaddoum (2019).
In the following subsection, we will explore some applied policies with the cooperative jam-
ming technique to enhance the performance and increase the security.
1.2.4.3 Jamming Policies
Several policies were proposed for relay selection to secure the communication Liu et al.
(2015); Sun et al. (2015); Hui et al. (2015); Jameel et al. (2018). In Liu et al. (2015), four relay
selection policies are proposed and compared, particularly random relay and random jammer,
best relay and best jammer, random jammer and best relay, and also best relay and no jammer.
This work characterizes the proposed relay selection policies, impact and the power of inter-
ference constraint on the secrecy performance by deriving new exact closed-form expressions
for the secrecy outage probability; it is shown that the jammer’s absence raises the outage satu-
ration phenomenon. In Hui et al. (2015), selection methods for the relay and the jammer were
developed in order to minimize the secrecy outage probability; in these selection methods, the
knowledge of the jammer and relay set is kept secret to the eavesdropper while each intermedi-
ate node knows its own role. As a result, the maintenance of the privacy of the selection greatly
improves the SOP performance of the system. This work assumes a decode and forward relay
system, in which through intermediate nodes in the presence of numerous passive eavesdrop-
pers, the destination can communicate with the source. To prohibit the eavesdroppers from
the interception of the signal of interest, the intermediate nodes act as jammers or as conven-
tional relays. To determine whether they will be serving as relays or jammers, the intermediate
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nodes take the decision based on the receiving information from the destination. Addition-
ally, the eavesdropper is unaware of the selection result to null the interference towards it. In
Luo & Yin (2018), a new scheme was provided in two-hops wireless networks. The source
communicates with the destination via N relays in the presence of a wiretapper. In each trans-
mission, one of these relays will be selected to jam the wiretapper, while the other N−1 relays
are retransmitting their received messages from the source towards the destination using dis-
tributed beamforming (DBF). Another scheme was provided in Liu et al. (2013) where in the
ﬁrst phase, the information bearing signal is transmitted by the source simultaneously as it is
cooperating with the destination in jamming the eavesdropper without interference at the relay.
In the second phase, a relay is selected optimally, which transmits the decoded source signal.
Meanwhile, this relay is cooperating with the source to jam the eavesdropper without creating
interference whereat the destination is located. The authors in Lin et al. (2013a) proposed a
new transmission scheme, where the relaying group and the jamming group are constructed
together. The jammers send the jamming signal and the useful message in the same time. This
scheme enables to confuse the wiretappers and increase the signal-to-noise ratio at the legiti-
mate receiver’s side. In Chen et al. (2013), attack strategies were investigated in a multi-relay
network that consists of both malicious and cooperative relays, where the malicious relays have
the freedom to listen to the transmitter in the ﬁrst hop (so that they can send interference signals
in the second hop). The direct emission of jamming signals in both hops is also investigated.
Subsequently, it is shown that the malicious relays should attack in both hops rather than just
listening in the ﬁrst hop and attacking in the second hop. On the other hand, the opportunis-
tic cooperative jamming and the opportunistic relay chatting schemes were compared in Ding
et al. (2011). It is shown that the chatting scheme where the relay nodes jam the eavesdropper
in the both phases, is better than the cooperative jamming scheme in which the eavesdropper is
only jammed in the ﬁrst phase. In Alibeigi & Taherpour (2019), the authors proposed a secu-
rity scheme in two-hops D2D communications, based on making use of other cellular users as
friendly jammers to jam an eavesdropper while this latter is trying to intercept the transmitted
message. According to their simulation results, a better secrecy performance is achieved when
the number of cellular users or the distance to the eavesdropper is increased. The researchers
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in Chen (2018) investigated the security over a two-users Gaussian interference channel, where
each source communicates with its corresponding destination. When one of the destinations
receives the other destination’s message, it will treat it as interference. They showed, for a
symmetric case, that the optimal secrecy rate is achieved as long as the interference-to-signal
ratio in decibel is no more than 2/3. Otherwise, cooperative jamming is needed to achieve
the optimal secrecy rate in their system. Furthermore, another scheme was studied in Mobini
et al. (2019) to secure a source-relay-destination link in the presence of an eavesdropper and
an external cooperating jammer. Two cooperating protocols were investigated: the full duplex
jammer protocol (FDJ), where all the nodes are half duplex except the relay is full duplex, and
the half duplex jammer protocol (HDJ), where all the nodes are half duplex. It is shown that,
from a secrecy perspective, FDJ is superior to HDJ.
1.2.4.4 Cooperative Jamming with Power Allocation
Since the system’s performance in cooperative jamming highly depends on the jamming strat-
egy and power level Park et al. (2013), three power allocation strategies were derived in Park
et al. (2013) for the SOP to be minimized. Moreover, three kinds of jamming power alloca-
tion schemes are proposed according to the available CSI at the destination to limit the outage
probability. In He et al. (2019), the researchers proposed three user-pair selection schemes
for untrustworthy relay networks with multiple source-destination pairs, namely opportunistic,
greedy and genie-aided user pair selection schemes. They showed that the greedy user-pair
selection scheme overcomes the other schemes from a secrecy perspective, due to the coop-
eration by the source that adds ﬂexibility to the network. The authors in Zhang et al. (2015)
investigated the cooperative jamming in MISO channels in which the legitimate receiver splits
the received power for energy harvesting and information decoding. Another power alloca-
tion method is analysed in Long et al. (2014) in which the source nodes send jamming signals
as a part of their power instead of hiring extra nodes to jam the eavesdropper. Two types of
jamming signals are analysed; a priori known jamming signals at the source nodes, and un-
known jamming signals at the source nodes. A major ﬁnding reported in this work is that, if
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the jamming signals are known a priori at the source nodes, the secrecy capacity is improved
signiﬁcantly when compared to the scenario in which the jamming signals are unknown. In
Yang et al. (2014), besides applying cooperative jamming technique, the base station utilizes
a linear precoding scheme, which exploits transmission diversity by weighting the information
stream. When the number of the friendly jammer’s antennas is no less than the total number
of the eavesdropping antennas, an optimal solution is obtained. The authors in Wang et al.
(2015a) proposed a sequential parametric convex approximation (SPCA) based algorithms to
address the power allocation optimization and maximize the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) lower
bound, and show that the secrecy capacity is improved by the optimized power allocation that
tends to allocate jamming signals more power. An optimal relay selection criterion and power
allocation strategy were derived in Wang & Wang (2014) between the jamming signals and
the conﬁdential information for the ESR maximization. Another study in Deng et al. (2015)
showed that a helper node should allocate its power as a jammer or as a helper depending on
the locations of the helper and the eavesdropper. In Do et al. (2019), the authors studied the
optimal transmit power in the presence of an active eavesdropper that is jamming the destina-
tion. The destination tells the source when to transmit the data and when to harvest energy
depending on the source’s power and the existence of jamming attacks by the eavesdropper.
The aim of their policy is to optimize the security and the allocated power at the source when
it is transmitting data under the energy harvesting constraint that is applied to the source.
1.2.5 Game Theory for Security
As an effective framework for the design of security mechanisms for wireless networks, Game
theory, traditionally applied in the areas of sociology, economics, biology, political science,
and resource allocation in wireless systems, has recently emerged. Moreover, jamming poli-
cies using game theory methods were proposed in Fakoorian & Swindlehurst (2013); Chen
et al. (2013); Stanojev & Yener (2013); Li et al. (2014b). In Chen et al. (2013), a multi-relay
network, consisting of both malicious and cooperative relays, applies Nash equilibrium game
strategy on its scheme, by modelling the sets of malicious relays and cooperative relays as two
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players in a zero sum game with the maximum achievable rate as the utility. The authors in
Fakoorian & Swindlehurst (2013) proposed a scheme of two users MISO Gaussian interfer-
ence channel, where the transmitters aim to maximize the difference between their secrecy rate
and that of the others. In this scheme, the weaker link tries to minimize the gap between its
secrecy rate and that of the other transmitter, while the transmitter with the stronger link tries
to maximize this gap. This paper used Nash equilibrium strategy as a solution in its scheme.
In Houjeij et al. (2013), using the non-cooperative game theory framework, the interactions in
CRNs between secondary users (SU)s and eavesdroppers were analysed. A novel secure chan-
nel selection algorithm has been proposed to solve the formulated game; the eavesdroppers and
the SUs are enabled to take distributed decisions in order to reach a Nash equilibrium point.
As showed by the authors, in terms of the average secrecy rate per SU, the proposed approach
yields signiﬁcant performance improvements especially when compared to a classical spectrum
sharing scheme. The researchers in Stanojev & Yener (2013) proposed another game-theoretic
model, Stackelberg game, with the legitimate parties being the owners of the spectrum acting
as a game leader, and the set of the assisting jammers become the followers. They showed that
as the number of potential jammers increases, a chosen jammer’s utility will decrease because
of the aggressiveness of the game leaders, i.e. the legitimate parties. In Li et al. (2014b), it
was shown that the strategies of the legitimate transmitters quickly learned by a smart jammer
would lead to an adjustment of the jammer’s strategy to damage the legitimate transmission.
Meanwhile, the existence of the smart jammer is well known from the transmitters. This sce-
nario of anti-jamming is modelled as a Stackelberg game, where the leader is the source node
and the follower is the jammer. It is shown that the obtained optimal power control strategies
from the Stackelberg equilibrium game can minimize the effect of the damage caused by the
jammer. As proposed by the authors in Zhu et al. (2010), and based on a reversed Stackelberg
game, a secure cooperative spectrum trading scheme in CRNs is applied; the illegal actions of
the SU are automatically supervised by the PU, who will adjust it’s strategies according to the
actions of the SU. In Badia & Gringoli (2019), the authors studied a game theory scenario in
the presence of a malicious node for two scenarios: when there is only one friendly jammer
and when there are multiple friendly jammers. Their study showed that even though the exis-
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tence of multiple friendly jammers enhances the security, it is still not effective enough to stop
the malicious node from trying to perform unauthorized transmissions because of the lack of
coordination between these jammers. Another interesting dynamic psychological game study,
between a soldier and an attacker, was investigated in Hu et al. (2019), where the soldier tries
to ﬁnish his mission in a certain time to pass through the battleﬁeld while keeping connected
to the Internet of Battleﬁeld Things (IOBT). In the mean time, the attaker is trying to delay
the soldier’s connection time with the IOBT by using jamming. Their results showed that by
using their proposed Bayesian updating algorithm, the soldier and the attacker can reach ε-like
psychological self-conﬁrming equilibrium strategies for their proposed psychological game.
However, more studies are still needed to investigate the schemes where there are multiple de-
fenders versus multiple attackers. Additionally, in most of the studies, the assumption of that
the defender and the attacker can detect the system state with no error, needs to be relaxed.
1.2.6 Key Generation Technique
Key generation is a technique where two legitimate nodes extract secret symmetric key bits by
exploiting the ﬂuctuations and the random characteristics of wireless communication channels.
It is a low cost solution since it does not require complex operations. For the model shown
in Fig. 1.1 where Bob and Alice want to establish a secure key while the eavesdropper is
listening to the legitimate channel between them. Bob, Alice, and Eve can get correlated
observations Yn = (Y1, ...,Yn), Xn = (X1, ...,Xn) and Zn = (Z1, ...,Zn), respectively. Over the
legitimate channel, Bob and Alice will exchange a message s while Eve is trying to eavesdrop
it. For a sufﬁciently large n and any ε > 0, R is the achievable key rate if there exists KB =
gB(Yn,s) and KA = gA(Xn,s) making the key generation satisfy the following Zhang et al.
(2016a):
• Bob and Alice are generating the same key with high probability Pr(KA = KB)< ε .
• No information is leaked to the eavesdropper which means guaranteeing the generated key’s
secrecy 1nI(K
A;s,Zn)< ε where I(.) is the mutual information.
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• The key rate R satisﬁes R> 1nH(KA)+ ε .
• Finally, the generated key is uniformly distributed 1n log |K | < 1nH
∣∣KA∣∣+ ε , where K de-
notes the alphabet of the generated key.
Moreover, the key capacity which is the largest key rate achieved is given by
CK = min [I(X ;Y ), I(X ;Y | Z)] , (1.14)
Most of works studied the key generation technique based on the characteristics of wireless
channels, while a few works have investigated schemes with static channels. The authors in
Guillaume et al. (2015) proposed a new scenario to generate random keys in static channels
by using a moving third party to exploit the channels’ characteristics between him and the
legitimate nodes to generate the key. In Madiseh et al. (2012), another scheme is proposed
to generate keys in static environments by employing random beamforming. Furthermore,
Huang & Wang (2013) also proposed a key generation scheme aided by frequency diversity and
opportunistic beamforming for long coherence time channels. In Felkaroski & Petri (2019), the
authors generated their keys from the CSI that was extracted from multiple mmWave subcar-
riers. This generation method yields a very fast bit generation rate, which enabled the com-
municating legitimate nodes to establish and refresh the shared generated secret key in a very
short period of time. Also, the authors in Zhang et al. (2018) proposed a two-way secret key
generation method, where each legitimate node shares its random signal with the other legiti-
mate node through the reciprocal channel. Then, each node will generate keys beneﬁting from
the randomness that comes from multiplying its received signal by its local signal. By apply-
ing this method, there is no need to rely on the CSI to generate keys. The results showed the
effectiveness of this method, not only theoretically, but also practically.
1.3 Unrealistic assumptions
In the literature, most of the security methods rely on knowing the eavesdropper’s channel,
location or both of them. Additionally, for our best of knowledge, the eavesdroppers in all the
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scenarios were receiving the whole transmitted message all the time. Many studies investigated
in the eavesdroppers’ passive behavior, and few considered the colluding one. Also, key gen-
erating techniques didn’t exploit the presence of having many untrusted nodes, and the secrecy
performance in impulsive noise invironments wasn’t been analysed yet. Therefore, we covered
each of these aforementioned points in our following articles.

CHAPTER 2
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2.1 Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the performance of the secrecy capacity in an amplify-and-forward
(AF) dual-hop network for both distributed beamforming (DBF) and opportunistic relaying
(OR) techniques. We derive the capacity scaling for two sets; U untrustworthy aggressive
relays cooperating together with a wire-tapper to intercept the message, and T trustworthy
relays, for a large number of nodes. We prove that the capacity scaling in the DBF is bounded
by a value depending on a ratio between the number of the trustworthy and the untrustworthy
aggressive relays. Finally, we show that DBF is better than OR whose capacity scaling is
proved to be upper-bounded by a value tending to zero when the untrustworthy relays are
aggressive. Simulation results conﬁrm our analytical derivations.
Keywords: Physical layer security, cooperative jamming, distributed beamforming, oppor-
tunistic relaying, amplify and forward.
2.2 Introduction
Security has always played a critical role in wireless cooperative communication systems de-
sign. The basic notion of physical layer security is to increase the legitimate links capacity
while decreasing the capacity of the illegitimate links, which is achievable via the utilisation of
the dynamic nature of wireless channels Liang et al. (2008); Gopala et al. (2008). Many con-
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tributions have been recently made to increase the secrecy capacity by combining advanced
strategies in wireless communications like beamforming, multiple antenna schemes, game the-
ory techniques and power allocation methods Atallah et al. (2015). Because of the broadcast
nature of the wireless network’s medium, all the users could be potential eavesdroppers within
the transmission range. Considering this point, recent works show that the secrecy rate could
be enhanced when treating the untrusted nodes as relays instead of treating them as eavesdrop-
pers Jeong et al. (2012); Yener & He (2010). In Jeong et al. (2012), this scenario is extended to
MIMO scheme with beamforming strategy. Furthermore, asymptotic analysis is often seen in
research as the “end of the line”; the attaining of a result that cannot be dramatically improved
upon. Therefore, asymptotic analysis is a method of describing limiting behaviour in systems
when they are very large. Hence, many works study the scaling performance from a security
perspective Sun et al. (2012); Kim et al. (2015). Using the opportunistic relaying OR scheme
as described in Sun et al. (2012), the scaling law of the secrecy capacity is investigated for
multiple untrustworthy relays. The researchers in Kim et al. (2015) have studied the maximum
capacity scaling according to the number of the untrustworthy relays by considering all relays
as untrustworthy passive nodes. Hence, the capacity scaling where the untrustworthy relays are
aggressive by sending their messages to a wire-tapper has not yet been studied in the literature.
Therefore, we investigate the following questions in this paper:
• What is the minimum secrecy-capacity scaling according to the number of untrustworthy
aggressive relays U and trustworthy relays T?
• Which scenario would be better, DBF or OR?
Our considered cooperative network contains one source, two sets of relays using AF tech-
nique, and one destination. Hence, the ﬁrst set includes untrustworthy relays which are col-
laborating together to eavesdrop the transmitted messages through an external wire-tapper, and
the other set includes trustworthy relays. Moreover, to reduce the eavesdropping capacity of
untrustworthy relays, the destination acts as a jammer and transmits a jamming signal to the
relays during the ﬁrst phase of communication. In this paper, an investigation of the asymptotic
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performance of DBF and OR using AF technique is performed. The contributions presented
in this paper are; 1) The secrecy capacity scaling is provided by showing that DBF has the
scaling of 12 log2(
T
U +1) at either the absence or the presence of the intended jamming (IJ) by
the destination. 2) In OR, the secrecy capacity scaling is upper bounded by a value tending to
zero for large number of T and U .
Notations: E[X ] and VAR[X ] denote the mean expectation and the variance of a random vari-
able (r.v.) X . Furthermore, fx(.) and Fx(.) denote the probability density function (PDF) and
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X , respectively. More,
w.p.1→ denotes the con-
vergence with probability one, [A ]+ denotes max{A,0}. For two functions f (x) and g(x),
f (x) ∼ g(x) means that limx→∞ f (x)
/
g(x) = 1 and lim1/x→0 f (
1
x )
/
g(1x ) = 1. For a r.v. X , the
notation X ∼ Nc(a,b) denotes that X is a complex Gaussian r.v. with mean a and variance b.
2.3 System Model
Consider a two-hop wireless network which consists of a source s communicating with a des-
tination d through a set of amplify-and-forward relays Rk = {1,2, ...,K} divided into two sets,
an untrustworthy set Ru = {1,2, ...,U} and a trustworthy set Rt = {1,2, ...,T} of relays, where
Ru∪Rt =Rk. The trustworthy relays are considered as an essential part of the network, whereas
the untrustworthy relays are the nodes that login to the network for a long enough period of
time. Moreover, the destination broadcasts the jamming signal toward all the relays. In our net-
work, each relay has a single antenna operating in half-duplex mode, as shown in Fig. 2.1. On
the other hand, the external wire-tapper cooperates with the untrustworthy relays to decode the
transmitted symbols of the source thanks to the different replicas of the source’s signal relayed
by these latter. Moreover, there is no direct link between the source and the destination in our
system, i.e. all transmitted information must pass by relays. In our analysis, the channels are
assumed to be uncorrelated reciprocal frequency-ﬂat block-fading with the coefﬁcient between
nodes i and j being denoted by hi, j and being modelled as a complex Gaussian random variable
where (i, j ∈ {s,Rk,d}). Therefore, the channel gains
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 and ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 are independent and
exponentially distributed r.v.’s whose means are σ21 and σ
2
2 respectively. We assume that the
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Figure 2.1 System model
noise variance N0 is the same in the ﬁrst and the second hop, and the channel state information
CSI is known by the receiving nodes. The source broadcasts the message signal xs in the ﬁrst
hop of transmission to the relays while the destination sends a jamming signal xd towrds the
relays. In the ﬁrst hop, the received signal at the kth relay is given by
yk = hs,k
√
Ps xs+hk,d
√
Pd xd+nk . (2.1)
Where nk is a complex additive white Gaussian noise at the kth relay with zero mean and
variance N0. The transmitted powers of the source and the destination are denoted by Ps and Pd
respectively. It is assumed that at the kth relay, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio SINR would be
γk =
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2
ρd
∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1 . (2.2)
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where the signal to noise ratio SNR is denoted by ρ ′i
Δ
=Pi
/
N0 , i ∈ {s,d}, ρ ′ ⊂ ρ where
ρ j
Δ
=Pj
/
N0 , j ∈ {s, t,u,d}. In the following subsections, we will derive the secrecy capac-
ities of DBF and OR respectively.
2.3.1 Distributed Beamforming
Using the DBF strategy at the relays’ side, the retransmitted signal by the ith relay in the
second hop is xi = aiwi yi . where wi, i ∈ {t,u} represents the optimized beamforming weight.
The normalized amplifying coefﬁcient ak for the kth relay is as follows
ak =
1√
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+ρd ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+N0 .
The destination receives a signal transmitted by each of the relays, which can be expressed as
yd= hk,dak wk yk+nd . (2.3)
Similarly, the wire-tapper receives a signal transmitted by each of the untrustworthy aggressive
relays
ye= hu,eauwu yu+ne . (2.4)
Where hu,e is the channel coefﬁcient between the untrustworthy relay and the external wire-
tapper, nd and ne are complex AWGN with zero mean and variance N0 at the destination and
at the wire-tapper respectively. After removing the jamming signal xd at the destination, the
received SINR becomes
γDBFd =
U
∑
u=1
ρs |hs,u|2 ρu
∣∣hu,d∣∣2
ρs |hs,u|2+(ρd +ρu) |hs,u|2+1
+
T
∑
t=1
ρs |hs,t |2 ρt
∣∣ht,d∣∣2
ρs |hs,t |2+(ρd +ρt)
∣∣ht,d∣∣2+1 . (2.5)
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Whereas the recieved SINR at the wire-tapper becomes
γe =
U
∑
u=1
ρs |hs,u|2 ρu |hu,e|2
ρuρd
∣∣hu,d∣∣2 |hu,e|2+ρs |hs,u|2+ρd ∣∣hu,d∣∣2+ρu |hu,e|2+1 . (2.6)
Therefore, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the DBF could be written as
CDBFS =
[
1
2
log2
(
1+
T
∑
t=1
ρs |hs,t |2 ρt
∣∣ht,d∣∣2
ρs |hs,t |2+(ρd +ρt)
∣∣ht,d∣∣2+1
+
U
∑
u=1
ρs |hs,u|2 ρu
∣∣hu,d∣∣2
ρs |hs,u|2+(ρd +ρu)
∣∣hu,d∣∣2+1
)
−1
2
log2
(
1+ γe
)]+
=
[
CDBFd −Cw
]+
. (2.7)
The data rate between the wire-tapper and all the untrustworthy relays cooperating with it is
denoted by Cw. Since the relays are half-duplex, we use the rate-loss factor value of 1/2.
2.3.2 Opportunistic Relaying
During the second hop, only the best relay b that has the maximum SNR at the destination
retransmits the signal. Through the kth relay, the end-to-end SINR is as follows
γs,k,d =
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 ρk ∣∣hk,d∣∣2
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+(ρd +ρk) ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1 . (2.8)
Hence, the best relay is selected as
b= argmax
k∈Rk
{γs,k,d} . (2.9)
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Therefore, the achievable secrecy capacity becomes
CORS =
[
1
2
log2
(
1+max
k
(γs,k,d)
)
−1
2
log2
(
1+ γe
)]+
=
[
CORd −Cw
]+
. (2.10)
2.4 SCALING LAW OF SECRECY CAPACITY
2.4.1 Scaling Law of Distributed Beamforming
This subsection shows that the secrecy capacity scaling of untrustworthy aggressive relays in
DBF is not the same as the maximum secrecy capacity for trustworthy relays. Without loss of
generality, we assume in our analysis that ρ Δ=ρs = ρt = ρu = ρd .
Theorem 1. When T → ∞ and U → ∞ with any ﬁnite ρ , the ergodic secrecy capacity of the
CDBFS = E{CDBFS } is lower bounded by 12 log2( TU +1).
Proof. It is shown in Bolcskei et al. (2006) that for T → ∞ and any ﬁnite ρ , the capacity
scaling through trustworthy relays in a dual hop network is upper bounded by 12 log2(T ). But
considering the aggressive behaviour of the untrustworthy relays, the secrecy capacity becomes
lower bounded by
CDBFS = E
{
CDBFS
}
= E
{[
1
2
log2
(
1+
T
∑
t=1
ρ |hs,t |2 ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2
ρ |hs,t |2+2ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2+1
+
U
∑
u=1
ρ |hs,u|2 ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2
ρ |hs,u|2+2ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2+1
)
−1
2
log2(1+ γe)
]+}
(a)
≥
[
E
{
1
2
log2
(
1+
T
∑
t=1
ρ |hs,t |2 ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2
ρ |hs,t |2+2ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2+1
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+
U
∑
u=1
ρ |hs,u|2 ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2
ρ |hs,u|2+2ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2+1
)}
−E
{
1
2
log2(1+ γe)
}]+
=
[
E
{
CDBFd
}−E {Cw}]+ . (2.11)
where (a) follows from the fact that E{max(X1,X2)} ≥ max(E{X1},E{X2}). Let
Nu
Δ
=
ρ |hs,u|2 ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2
ρ2
∣∣hd,u∣∣2 |hu,e|2+ρ |hs,u|2+ρ |hu,e|2+ρ ∣∣hu,d∣∣2+1 , (2.12)
and
Mt
Δ
=
ρ |hs,t |2 ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2
ρ |hs,t |2+ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2+1 . (2.13)
Mt satisﬁes the Kolmogorov conditions i.e.
T
∑
t=1
VAR[Mt ]
t2 < ∞ and μt =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
E [Mt ] < ∞ are true
for any ﬁnite ρ Bolcskei et al. (2006). Nu also satisﬁes Kolmogorov conditions since Nu <Mt ,
so we can apply the following theorem Serﬂing (1980):
U
∑
u=1
Nu
U
−
U
∑
u=1
E [Nu]
U
w.p.1→ 0. (2.14)
Therefore, γDBFd
w.p.1→ U μu, and E
{
CDBFd
}∼ 12 log2(T+U), where μu= 1U U∑
u=1
E [Nu]<∞. Thus
CDBFS ≥
[
E
{
CDBFd
}−E {Cw}]+
∼
[
1
2
log2(T +U)−
1
2
log2(U)
]+
=
1
2
log2
(T
U
+1
)
. (2.15)
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It is clear from (2.15) that the lower bounded secrecy capacity depends on the ratio between T
and U . For example, to maintain a certain level of secrecy capacity in a wireless network, the
maximum number of untrustworthy aggressive relays should not exceed:
U ≤ T
22C
DBF
S
. (2.16)
Let’s assume that the wire-tapper could receive more signals from other trustworthy relays T ′
where T ′ ≤ T . Hence, the total number of the relays that the wire-tapper could combine the
signals from will be U ′, where U ′ = T ′+U . In this case, and by following the same steps in
the proof of Theorem 1, the secrecy capacity scaling in equation (2.15) will be
CDBFS ≥
[
1
2
log2(T +U)−
1
2
log2(U
′)
]+
=
[
1
2
log2(T +U)−
1
2
log2(T
′+U)
]+
=
1
2
log2
( T +U
T ′+U
)
. (2.17)
which tends to zero for T ′ = T .
Moreover, we will show in Theorem 2 that even when the destination is not jamming, the
secrecy capacity scaling will tend to the same bound value of DBF with IJ as given in equation
(2.15).
Theorem 2. When T →∞ andU →∞ with any ﬁnite ρ , the ergodic secrecy capacity of a DBF
without IJ tends to the value 12 log2(
T
U +1).
Proof. Considering that the ergodic secrecy capacity of a DBF without IJ is given by
CDBFS,NoJam = E
{
CDBFS,NoJam
}
= E
{[
1
2
log2
(
1+
T
∑
t=1
ρ |hs,t |2 ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2
ρ |hs,t |2+ρ
∣∣ht,d∣∣2+1 +
U
∑
u=1
ρ |hs,u|2 ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2
ρ |hs,u|2+ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2+1
)
−
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1
2
log2(1+
U
∑
u=1
ρs |hs,u|2 ρu |hu,e|2
ρs |hs,u|2+ρu |hu,e|2+1
)
]+}
. (2.18)
It can be shown by following the same procedure as that in Theorem 1 that E
{
CDBFS,NoJam
}
∼
1
2 log2(
T
U +1).
2.4.2 Scaling Law of Opportunistic Relaying
It was shown that the lower bound for ergodic secrecy capacity tends to zero as the total number
of the relays K → ∞ Sun et al. (2012). Considering the aggressive behaviour of the untrust-
worthy relays, we calculate here the upper bound value for the secrecy capacity.
Proof. Let
X = 1+max
k
(
1
2
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 2ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+2ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1),
Y = 1+
U
∑
u=1
ρ |hs,u|2 ρ
∣∣hu,d∣∣2
ρ2
∣∣hu,d∣∣2 |hu,e|2+ρ |hs,u|2+ρ |hu,e|2+ρ ∣∣hu,d∣∣2+1 ,
and Z = 1+max
k
(
ρ|hs,k|2
2 ). Then, the secrecy capacity will be upper bounded by
E{CORS } = E
{[
1
2
log2(
X
Y
)
]+}
< E
{
1
2
log2(1+
X
Y
)
}
= E
[
1
2
log2(X +Y )−
1
2
log2(Y )
]
(a)
≤ 1
2
log2
(
E [X ]+E [Y ]
)
− 1
2
log2
(
E [Y ]
)
(b)
<
1
2
log2
(
E [Z]+E [Y ]
)
− 1
2
log2
(
E [Y ]
)
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(c)∼ 1
2
log2
(ρ
2
log2K+U
)
− 1
2
log2(U)
∼ 1
2
log2
(ρ log2K
2U
+1
)
, (2.19)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, (b) follows from the fact that
ρ|hs,k|22ρ|hk,d|2
ρ|hs,k|2+2ρ|hk,d|2+1 <
ρ|hs,k|22ρ|hk,d|2
ρ|hs,k|2+2ρ|hk,d|2 ≤ min(ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 ,2ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2)≤ ρ ∣∣hs,k∣∣2, (c) follows from the fact that
E{maxk(ρ
∣∣hk,d∣∣2)} ∼ ρ log2K +O(log2 log2K) Sharif & Hassibi (2005) and E(Y ) = U by
following the same steps in our proof of Theorem 1. However, when T → ∞ and U → ∞ with
any ﬁnite ρ , equation (2.19) tends to zero.
Therefore, based on the results given in equations (2.15) and (2.19), we can conclude that DBF
guarantees better security than OR technique.
Assuming that ρ Δ=ρs = ρt = ρu = ρd = 5 dB and U = T , we do the performance comparison
of the ergodic secrecy capacity between the lower bound DBF, OR and DBF with and without
IJ and we show the outcome in Fig. 2.2. Moreover, we assume that the relays are located near
the middle of the source and the destination, and the variances σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1. It is observed in
Fig. 2.2 that increasing the total number of relays gives better performance for DBF network,
but it reduces the secrecy capacity of OR to zero even at the presence of IJ. Moreover, Fig. 2.2
shows a secrecy capacity gap between DBF without IJ and the one with IJ. Therefore, it can be
seen that with the absence of IJ, DBF tends to reach its secrecy capacity scaling quickly.
2.5 Conclusions
The capacity scaling of secure cooperative relaying with DBF and OR through trustworthy and
untrustworthy aggressive relays has been investigated in this paper. Considering the aggres-
siveness of the untrustworthy relays in DBF, we conclude that 1) Secrecy capacity scaling is
bounded by a value that depends on the ratio between the number of the trustworthy and the
untrustworthy aggressive relays, this value is reached quickly with the absence of IJ. 2) Based
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Figure 2.2 Ergodic secrecy capacity: ρ Δ=ρs = ρt = ρu = ρd = 5 dB,
σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1, and U = T
on our results, OR is not recommended for security issues, leading to the priority being handed
over to DBF strategy.
CHAPTER 3
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3.1 Abstract
This paper proposes a new location-based multicasting technique, for dual phase amplify-and-
forward (AF) large networks, aiming to improve the security in the presence of non-colluding
passive eavesdroppers. These eavesdroppers could also be part of this cooperative network
as relays. In order to reduce the impact of these eavesdroppers on the network security, we
propose a new transmission strategy where, for the ﬁrst hop of each transmission time, while
the destination is jamming, the source randomly chooses a different subset K of the total T
relays, to transmit its message towards the destination. For practical implementation, sectoral
transmission can be achieved with analog beamforming at the source’s side. In the second hop,
using the distributed beamforming technique, the K AF relays retransmit the received signal to
the destination. We analytically demonstrated that the proposed technique decreases the prob-
ability of choosing the same sector that has certain eavesdroppers again, for each transmission
time, to K/T . Moreover, we also show that the secrecy capacity scaling of our technique is
still the same as for broadcasting. Hereafter, the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy out-
age probability are calculated, and it is shown that the security performance is remarkably
enhanced, compared to conventional multicasting technique.
Keywords: Physical layer security, jamming, secrecy outage probability, amplify and forward,
secrecy capacity, scaling.
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3.2 Introduction
Physical layer security (PLS) is considered a promising approach for strengthening the security
in wireless communication. One of the most important tools to measure the security perfor-
mance in PLS is the security rate, in which the channel capacity of the legitimate links should
be higher than the capacity of the illegitimate ones. Otherwise, it is equal to zero Gopala et al.
(2008). In order to achieve a positive secrecy rate, many techniques have been proposed, such
as cooperative jamming (CJ) Lee et al. (2018); Atallah et al. (2015), multi-antenna scenarios
Chen et al. (2017), beamforming Guo et al. (2017), game theory Silva & Cordero (2017), and
power allocation schemes Atallah et al. (2015). In the literature, the aforementioned techniques
were sometimes combined to achieve better security. In Cumanan et al. (2017), a CJ technique,
by multiple jammers, was combined with an optimal power allocation technique to achieve a
better security rate in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The authors in Wang et al.
(2013a) combined cooperative beamforming (CB) and CJ techniques to achieve higher secu-
rity. The combination of CB and CJ was studied again in Wang & Wang (2015) in the presence
of multi-antenna eavesdroppers. Due to the nature of the wireless medium, nodes can join and
leave the network frequently. These nodes could be beneﬁcial to the network, when being used
as relays, and could also be considered as potential eavesdroppers. However, as demonstrated
in Jeong et al. (2012) and Yener & He (2010), treating these nodes as relays could be more ben-
eﬁcial to the wireless network, from a security perspective, than treating them as eavesdroppers.
In cooperative relaying networks, two main scenarios were studied in the literature, the oppor-
tunistic relaying (OR) one, where the best relay is chosen to retransmit the message, and the
distributed beamforming (DBF) one, where all the relays retransmit their received messages
towards the destination using the beamforming transmission. In A. El-Malek et al. (2017), the
secrecy performance, considering OR networks, was studied after applying power allocation
and jamming techniques, in the presence of interference and many eavesdroppers. Also, the
secrecy outage probability (SOP) lower and upper bounds, in OR networks, were investigated
in Mabrouk et al. (2017) using CJ under outdated channel state information (CSI). Moreover,
hybrid schemes that contain DBF and CJ were investigated in Wang & Xia (2015). Hereafter, a
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joint cooperative beamforming, jamming, and power-allocation scheme was proposed in Wang
et al. (2015b) to enhance the security performance in cooperative relay networks. In this di-
rection, the authors in Kim et al. (2015) studied the secrecy capacity scaling and the asymptotic
performance of a two-hops network, with untrustworthy relays, for both OR and DBF. There-
after, these scenarios were extended in Atallah & Kaddoum (2016) to study the secrecy scaling
laws for dual phase large networks, with wiretappers that are cooperating between each other
to intercept the messages. The majority of the proposed techniques in the literature assumed
that the wiretappers are receiving the data all the time, which can harm the security. To tackle
this challenge, in this paper, we propose a new location-based multicasting technique, based
on sending just a part of the information to a certain sector for a certain transmission time, and
then switching to other sectors randomly to send the other parts. This transmission strategy
can be practically implemented thanks to analog beamforming at the source’s side. We mathe-
matically demonstrate that our proposed technique reduces the possibility of an eavesdropper
intercepting the whole message, since it’s getting just a part of it. Also, we show that the se-
crecy capacity scaling converges to the same value of the broadcasting method in Kim et al.
(2015). Moreover, an analysis of secrecy outage probability (SOP) lower and upper bounds
is provided, and shows a remarkable improvement compared to the conventional multicasting
scenario and OR techniques in A. El-Malek et al. (2017) and Mabrouk et al. (2017).
Notations: VAR[X ] and E[X ] respectively denote the variance and the mean expectation of
a random variable (r.v.) X . Also, FX(.) and fX(.) denote the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) and the probability density function (PDF) of X , respectively. Moreover,
w.p.1→ denotes
the convergence with probability one, and [A ]+ denotes max{A,0}. For a r.v. X , the notation
X ∼ Nc(a,b) denotes that X is a complex Gaussian r.v. with variance b and mean a.
3.3 System Model and Problem Formulation
Consider a multi-antennas access point s, T amplify-and-forward (AF) relays clustered into
G = T/K ∈ N+ clusters, where K is the number of relays in each cluster, a destination d and
a passive eavesdropper e, that could also take part of this cooperative network as a relay. Each
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Figure 3.1 System model consisting of a multi-antennas source s, T relays
clustered in G sectors, a destination d and an eavesdropper e. In this ﬁgure,
T = 9, K = 3 and G= 3
relay has a single antenna, as shown in Fig. 3.1, and operates in a half-duplex mode. It is
assumed that there is no direct link between the source and the destination, which means that
all the transmitted information should be forwarded by the relays. This scenario can represent
a D2D cooperative network. As shown in Fig. 3.1, in the ﬁrst hop of each transmission time,
while d is jamming the relays, s will multicast the signal xs,g to the gth cluster that contains K
relays in it, where 1 ≤ g ≤ G. In the second phase, the K relays will forward the received
message towards d, using the distributed beamforming technique, which has been proven to
outperform the opportunistic one Kim et al. (2015), Atallah & Kaddoum (2016). After each
transmission time, s will choose another set of K relays to transmit towards d. Hence, the
received signal expression, at a kth relay, where 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is given by
yk =
√
Ps hs,k xs,g+
√
Pd hd,k xd+nk, (3.1)
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where nk ∼Nc (0,N0) is the complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the kth relay, Ps
and Pd are the transmitted powers from the s and d respectively. In our analysis, we assume that
the channels are quasi-static block Rayleigh channels, i.e. the channel coefﬁcients hl, j, where
l ∈ {s,k,d} and j ∈ {k,e,d}, are constant during the transmission time of one message, but
may change independently to different values thereafter. Moreover, we assume that the CSI
is known by the receiving nodes. Accordingly, the channel gains
∣∣hl, j∣∣2 follow independent
exponential distributions. It is also assumed that the noise variance N0 has the same value in
the ﬁrst and the second phases. Consequently, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) at the kth relay becomes
γk =
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2
ρd
∣∣hd,k∣∣2+1 , (3.2)
where ρi
Δ
=Pi
/
N0, and i ∈ {s,k,e,d}. If e is not in the sector covered by the antenna beam of
the transmitter, then it will not receive the message xs,g. Thus, the received signal expression
at e can be expressed as
ye = b.
√
Ps hs,e xs,g+
√
Pd hd,e xd+ne, (3.3)
where b is a Bernoulli r.v. that takes the value 0 when e is in the uncovered sector, and 1 when
e is in the covered sector. Hence, when b= 0, the received signal at e is given by
ye =
√
Pd hd,e xd+ne . (3.4)
Since the probability of e being in the covered sector is equal to K/T , then the probability
mass function of b is expressed as
Pr(b= 1) = p1 =
K
T
, (3.5)
Pr(b= 0) = p0 = 1− p1 = 1− KT . (3.6)
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From (3.3), the SINR at e is obtained as
γe′ =
b.ρs |hs,e|2
ρd
∣∣hd,e∣∣2+1 , (3.7)
The expected value of the SINR at the eavesdropper’s side becomes
γe =
1
∑
i=0
Pr(b= i)γe′b=i (3.8)
= 0+
K
T
ρs |hs,e|2
ρd
∣∣hd,e∣∣2+1
=
K
T
ρs |hs,e|2
ρd
∣∣hd,e∣∣2+1 . (3.9)
In the second hop, the retransmitted message from the kth relay will take the following form
xk =αk wk yk,wherewk is the optimized beamforming weight, and αk represents the normalized
amplifying coefﬁcient. From (3.1), αk can be calculated as αk = 1√
ρs |hs,k|2+ρd |hd,k|2+N0
. In the
second hop, the received message, at d, from the K relays, is given as
yd =∑Kk=1 hk,d αk wk yk+nd, (3.10)
where nd ∼ Nc (0,N0) is the complex AWGN at d. After receiving yd , the destination will
extract xs,g, after removing the jamming signal xd . From Kim et al. (2015) and the references
therein, the SINR at the destination’s side becomes
γd =∑Kk=1
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 ρk ∣∣hk,d∣∣2
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+(ρd+ρk) ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1 . (3.11)
From (3.11) and (3.8), the secrecy capacity CS = [Cd−Ce]+ will be given by
CS =
[
1
2
log2
(
1+∑Kk=1
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 ρk ∣∣hk,d∣∣2
ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+(ρd+ρk) ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1
)
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−1
2
log2
(
1+
K
T
ρs |hs,e|2
ρd
∣∣hd,e∣∣2+1
)]+
, (3.12)
whereCd andCe are the data rates from s, to d and e, respectively. The loss rate, 1/2, was used
in (3.12) due to the constraint of operating the half-duplex mode at the relays. In the following
section, we will calculate the SOP lower and upper bounds of CS.
3.4 Lower and Upper Bounds of Secrecy Outage Probability
From (3.12), the SOP expression can be written as
pout = Pr [CS < R] (3.13)
= Pr
⎡
⎣1+∑Kk=1 12 γs,k 2γk,dγs,k+2γk,d +1
1+ KT
γs,e
γd,e+1
< u
⎤
⎦
∼ Pr
⎡
⎣1+∑Kk=1 12 γs,k 2γk,dγs,k+2γk,d
1+ KT
γs,e
γd,e+1
< u
⎤
⎦ , (3.14)
where R is the threshold and u= 22R. We will use the following inequality to calculate the
lower and upper bounds of the SOP Mabrouk et al. (2017). For any two r.v. X and Y
1
2
min{X ,Y} ≤ XY
X +Y
≤ min{X ,Y} . (3.15)
From (3.14) and (3.15), we have
1
2
min
{
γs,k,2γk,d
}≤ γs,k 2γk,dγs,k+2γk,d ≤ min
{
γs,k,2γk,d
}
.
Thus, the SOP lower and upper bounds can be respectively expressed as
Pout ≤ Pr
⎡
⎣1+ 14∑Kk=1min{γs,k,2γk,d}
1+ KT
γs,e
γd,e+1
< u
⎤
⎦= Pout,UB,
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Pout ≥ Pr
⎡
⎣1+ 12∑Kk=1min{γs,k,2γk,d}
1+ KT
γs,e
γd,e+1
< u
⎤
⎦= Pout,LB.
We evaluate the general expression of the SOP bounds as follows
Pout,B = Pr
⎡
⎣1+ 1θ ∑Kk=1min{γs,k,2γk,d}
1+ KT
γs,e
γd,e+1
< u
⎤
⎦ , (3.16)
where θ takes the values 2 and 4 for the SOP lower and upper bounds, respectively.
Theorem 3. The secrecy outage probability lower and upper bounds, of our proposed tech-
nique, are given by
pout,B = 1− λ0
K
Γ(K)
(s2−s3 (s4−s5)) , (3.17)
where s3, s2, s4, and s5 are respectively given in (3.25), (3.26), (3.29) and (3.30).
Proof. From (3.16), the SOP is bounded by
Pout,B = Pr
⎡
⎣1+ 1θ ∑Kk=1min{γs,k,2γk,d}
1+ KT
γs,e
γd,e+1
< u
⎤
⎦
= Pr
[
1+ 1θ A
B
< u
]
= 1−Pr
[
B<
θ +A
θu
]
, (3.18)
where B= 1+ KT
γs,e
γd,e+1
, and A=
K
∑
k=1
min
{
γs,k,2γk,d
}
.
We have B> 1 ⇒ θ +A
θu
> 1 ⇒ A> θu−θ . (3.19)
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From (3.18) and (3.19), and assuming that A and B are independent, the SOP bounds are
obtained as
pout,B = 1−
∞∫
θu−θ
FB
(
θ +A
θu
)
fA (a)da. (3.20)
Lemma 1. The PDF of A and the CDF of B are respectively given by
fA(a) = aK−1 e−λ0 a
λ0K
Γ(K)
, (3.21)
FB (b) = 1− exp
[
−λ1 (b−1) TK
]
λ2
λ1 (b−1) TK +λ2
, (3.22)
where Γ(X) =
∫ ∞
0 t
X−1 e−t dt, is the Gamma function,
λ1 =
1
ρ σ21
, λ2 =
1
ρ σ22
, and λ0 =
1
ρ σ21
+
1
2ρ σ22
. (3.23)
Where σ21 and σ
2
2 are the means of
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 and ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 respectively.
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix I.
By using Lemma 1’s results, the bounds in (3.20) can be expressed as
pout,B = 1−
∞∫
θu−θ
(
1− exp
[
−λ1
(
θ +A
θu
−1
)
T
K
]
× λ2
λ1
(θ+A
θu −1
) T
K +λ2
)
aK−1 e−λ0 a λ0
K
Γ(K)
da
= 1− λ0
K
Γ(K)
⎡
⎣s2− s3 ∞∫
θu−θ
s1da
⎤
⎦ , (3.24)
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where s3 =
θuK λ2
λ1T
exp
(
λ1T
K
(
1− 1
u
))
, (3.25)
s2 =
∞∫
θu−θ
aK−1 e−λ0 a da
= λ−K0 Γ(K)+λ
−K
0 [−Γ(K)+Γ(K,λ0 (θu−θ))] , (3.26)
and
s1 =
aK−1 exp
(
−a
( β︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ0+
λ1T
Kθu
))
a+( θ −θu+ θuK λ2
λ1T
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ
=
aK−1 exp(−aβ )
a+φ
. (3.27)
Thus, to calculate
∫ ∞
θu−θ s1 da in (3.24), we will integrate by parts as follows
∞∫
θu−θ
s1 da=
∞∫
θu−θ
UdV =VU
∣∣∣∞
θu−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
s4
−
∞∫
θu−θ
VdU
︸ ︷︷ ︸
s5
, (3.28)
where dV = exp(−aβ )a+φ da ⇒ V = exp(βφ)Ei (−β (a+φ)) , and U = aK−1 ⇒
dU = (K−1)aK−2 da. Here, Ei (X) = −
∫ ∞
−X
e−t
t dt, is the exponential integral of the r.v. X .
From (3.28), s4 and s5 are calculated as
s4 = −(θu−θ)K−1 exp(βφ)Ei (−β (θu−θ +φ)) , (3.29)
s5 = (K−1)eβφ
∞∫
θu−θ
aK−2Ei (−β (a+φ))da
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(†)
= (K−1)eβφ E1 (β (θu−θ +φ))s6−e(−β (θu−θ+φ)) s7 . (3.30)
(†) follows from using the integral in [Ng (1969), Section 4.1, Eq. 7] after employing the
following property E1 (X) =−Ei (−X) . Thus, s6 and s7 in (3.30) are deﬁned as
s6 =
K−2
∑
m=0
(−1)m (K−2)!(θu−θ)K−m−2 (θu−θ +φ)m+1
(K−2−m)!(m+1)! ,
s7 = ∑K−2m=0
(K−2)!(θu−θ)K−m−2
(K−2−m)!(m+1)!βm+1
×∑mj=0 (−1) j (m− j)!(β (θu−θ +φ)) j.
Substituting (3.25), (3.26), (3.29), and (3.30) in (3.24), we completed the proof.
3.5 Scaling Law of Secrecy Capacity
In this section, we will show that the secrecy capacity of our proposed technique converges to
1
2 log2(T ). To prove this, we will show that, for large K and T , the lower and upper bounds ofCS
scale to 12 log2(T ). Without loss of generality, in our analysis, we assume that ρ
Δ
= ρs = ρd = ρk,
but the extension using different values of ρi is straightforward.
Theorem 4. The ergodic secrecy capacity CS = E {CS}, for any ﬁnite ρ , is lower bounded by
1
2 log2(T ).
Proof.
E {CS}= E
{[
1
2
log2
(
1+
K
∑
k=1
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+2ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1
)
−1
2
log2
(
1+
K
T
ρ |hs,e|2
ρ
∣∣hd,e∣∣2+1
)]+}
52
(†)
≥
[
E
{
1
2
log2
(
1+
K
∑
k=1
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+2ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1
)}
−E
{
1
2
log2
(
1+
K
T
ρ |hs,e|2
ρ
∣∣hd,e∣∣2+1
)}]+
= [E {Cd}−E {Ce}]+, (3.31)
(†) follows from applying Jensen’s inequality on the convex function max(X1,X2), which is
E {max(X1,X2)} ≥ max(E {X1} ,E {X2}). From Bolcskei et al. (2006), we have that Kol-
mogorov conditions are satisﬁed for
Mk
Δ
=
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2
ρ
∣∣hs,k∣∣2+ρ ∣∣hk,d∣∣2+1 .
i.e., 1K ∑
K
k=1E [Mk] < ∞, and ∑
K
k=1
VAR[γk]
k2
< ∞, are true. Since γdk
Δ
=
ρ |hs,k|2 ρ |hk,d|2
ρ |hs,k|2+2ρ |hk,d|2+1 <
Mk,⇒ γdk also satisﬁes the Kolmogorov conditions, which are μ Δ= 1K ∑Kk=1E [γdk] < ∞, and
∑Kk=1
VAR[γdk]
k2
< ∞. Hence, we can apply the following theorem [(Serﬂing, 1980, 1.8.D)]
∑Kk=1
γk
K
−∑Kk=1
E [γk]
K
w.p.1→ 0. (3.32)
Resultantly, γk
w.p.1→ Kμ . Substituting in (3.31), we get
CS ≥ [E {Cd}−E {Ce}]+
=
[
1
2
(log2K+ log2 μ)−
1
2
(
log2
K
T
+ log2
ρ |hs,e|2
ρ
∣∣hd,e∣∣2+1
)]+
∼
[
1
2
log2K−
1
2
log2
K
T
]+
=
1
2
log2T. (3.33)
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From Bolcskei et al. (2006), the asymptotic capacity scaling upper bound of dual phase relay-
ing networks through trustworthy relays, where the source is broadcasting towards the relays
in the ﬁrst hop, is shown to be 1/2log2T . Considering, for K → ∞, that our technique acts
like broadcasting, the result in Bolcskei et al. (2006) will be the asymptotic upper bound ofCS.
Thus, by showing that both the lower and upper bounds coincide with 1/2log2T , we completed
the proof.
3.6 Simulation Results
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Figure 3.2 Analytical and simulated SOP lower bound performances of the
proposed system with jamming:
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 = 1, R= 1bps/Hz, and K = 5
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Figure 3.3 Analytical and simulated SOP upper bound performances of the
proposed system and OR with jamming:
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 = 1, and R= 1bps/Hz
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme by means of analytical and simula-
tion results of the SOP and the secrecy capacity scaling. It’s assumed that ρ Δ= ρs = ρd = ρk,
R= 1bps/Hz and
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 = 1.
Fig. 3.2 shows a comparison, of the SOP lower bound, between the broadcasting (the green
curve), and our proposed technique, which is shown to be, from a security perspective, remark-
ably better than the former technique. In the simulation results, it is assumed that K is ﬁxed
and equal to 5. We can see that the analytical expression, given in (3.17), perfectly matches the
SOP lower bound, for different values of T . Also, we can notice that the SOP is improved when
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Figure 3.4 Simulated secrecy capacity scaling:
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the total number of the relays T increases. In fact, the higher the T is, the less the probability
that an eavesdropper receives a signal from s, and the better the secrecy performance becomes.
Fig. 3.3 shows a comparison between the SOP upper bound for our technique and the OR
technique that was proposed in A. El-Malek et al. (2017) and Mabrouk et al. (2017), with jam-
ming, for different values of K and T . It is shown that the secrecy performance is remarkably
enhanced with adding more relays to the network. Also, a noticeable improvement is shown in
our proposed technique compared to the OR technique proposed in A. El-Malek et al. (2017)
and Mabrouk et al. (2017).
Fig. 3.4 shows the secrecy capacity scaling comparison between our proposed technique, the
broadcasting, and the conventional multicasting transmission, for ρ Δ= ρs = ρd = ρk = 10 dB
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and T = 3K. Moreover, we show the performance for the case where all the relays are trusted
(the black curve). From Fig. 3.4, we can see that 1) our technique scaled similar to, even
slightly better than, the broadcasting technique, which gives an advantage to our proposed
technique, since the eavesdropper receives just a part of the message, whereas it receives all
the transmitted message when the broadcasting scenario is applied Kim et al. (2015). 2) A
security enhancement was achieved compared to the conventional multicasting technique.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new location-based multicasting cooperation strategy that takes
advantage of the locations of all the nodes to enhance the security. We provided an analytical
study for the SOP, and we showed that the secrecy capacity scaling, of the proposed technique,
converges to values similar to the broadcasting case. Moreover, it was shown that the SOP is
improved when the total number of relays T increases. Our results also displayed remarkable
security performance improvement, compared to the conventional multicasting technique. As
future work, we will further improve the current study by considering aggressive eavesdrop-
pers.
CHAPTER 4
DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SECURE MULTICASTING
COOPERATIVE PROTOCOL FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK
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4.1 Abstract
This paper proposes a new security cooperative protocol, for dual phase amplify-and-forward
large wireless sensor networks. In such a network, a portion of the K relays can be potential
eavesdroppers. The source agrees to share with the destination a given channel state infor-
mation (CSI) of a source-trusted relay-destination link to encode the message. Then, in the
ﬁrst hop, the source will use this CSI to map the right message to a certain sector while trans-
mitting fake messages to the other sectors using sectoral transmission. In the second hop, the
relays retransmit their received signals to the destination, using the distributed beamforming
technique. We derived the secrecy outage probability and demonstrated that the probability
of receiving the right encoded information by an untrustworthy relay is inversely proportional
to the number of sectors. We also showed that the aggressive behavior of the cooperating
untrusted relays is not effective compared to the case where each untrusted relay is trying to
intercept the transmitted message individually.
Keywords: Physical layer security, secrecy outage probability, amplify and forward, secrecy
capacity.
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4.2 Introduction
In wireless networks, nodes can join and leave frequently, which increases the risk of the ma-
licious nodes that are penetrating the wireless network. Therefore, the demand for security
solutions in the physical layer is becoming more and more essential. One of the important
metrics that evaluate the security performance in the physical layer is the secrecy rate, which
is the difference between the channel capacity of the legitimate links and the channel capacity
of the illegitimate ones Gopala et al. (2008). Many techniques have been proposed to achieve
a positive secrecy rate, such as multi-antenna scenarios, beamforming, game theory, power
allocation schemes and cooperative jamming Wang et al. (2014b), Kuhestani et al. (2018a),
Kuhestani et al. (2016) and Atallah et al. (2015). A wireless network could beneﬁt from
the new joining nodes, by using them as relays, or by treating them as potential eavesdroppers.
However, as shown in Kuhestani et al. (2016) and Kuhestani et al. (2018b), taking advantage of
these nodes and using them as relays could be more useful to the wireless network, from a secu-
rity perspective, than treating them as eavesdroppers. The authors in Kim et al. (2015) studied
the secrecy performance for the case of multiple passive untrusted relays, where each passive
untrusted relay is trying to intercept its received message individually. In Atallah & Kaddoum
(2016), the authors studied the secrecy capacity scaling with aggressive untrusted relays. We
deﬁne the aggressive behavior as when the untrusted relays are cooperating between each other
by sending their received messages to an external wiretapper. Both Kim et al. (2015) and Atal-
lah & Kaddoum (2016) considered two transmission schemes, namely opportunistic relaying
(OR) and distributed beamforming (DBF). They also demonstrated that DBF outperforms OR
technique from a secrecy perspective. In Atallah & Kaddoum (2017), a new location-based
multicasting technique was proposed considering both passive and aggressive untrusted relays
behaviors. It was shown that this technique enhances the security compared to Kim et al.
(2015) and Atallah & Kaddoum (2016).
On the other hand, the randomness of the channel has been exploited for different purposes,
whether to enhance the reliability or to secure the communication system as it was used to
generate keys in Li et al. (2005). Therefore, in this paper, we combine the channel randomness
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with multicasting transmission to propose a new location-based multicasting protocol in two-
hops wireless sensor networks (WSN). The goal of this protocol is to increase the security of
these networks while taking into account that wireless sensor nodes have limited capabilities.
In the proposed protocol, the source and the destination share the channel state information
(CSI) to map the source’s transmission by sending the useful encoded message towards a spe-
ciﬁc sector, while sending other fake messages, similar to the useful one, towards the other
sectors to confuse the eavesdroppers. Thus, we propose two strategies: the ﬁrst one is to pre-
vent the eavesdropper from receiving the transmitted message all the time by multicasting the
signal to a different sector in each transmission time. Hence, for an eavesdropper located in
a certain sector, the probability that it would be in the right sector is inversely proportional to
the number of sectors, p = 1/N  1. This eavesdropper can still know when there is a trans-
mission towards it and when there isn’t. Also, it can know to which sector this transmitted
signal is multicasted when this eavesdropper cooperates with other eavesdroppers located in
other sectors. Therefore, we came up with the second strategy which is based on sending fake
messages towards the other sectors to increase the entropy and the confusion, related to being
in the right sector, at the eavesdroppers. We provide analytical expressions for the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) of both passive and aggressive untrusted relays. Our numerical re-
sults show how our technique enhances the security performance and how immune it is against
the aggressive behavior of the untrusted relays. Finally, adopting such a security protocol by
allowing a part of the nodes to forward fake messages is promising because of the availability
of high number of cheap electronic sensors with limited computational capabilities.
4.3 System Model and Problem Formulation
Consider a source s equipped with multi-sectoral antennas, K amplify-and-forward (AF) coop-
erative relay sensor nodes with limited capabilities, and a destination d, provided with sectoral
antennas. Out of the K relays, there are U untrustworthy relays that could be potential eaves-
droppers. Each relay is equipped with a single antenna and works in a half-duplex mode, as
shown in Fig.3.1. It is assumed that there is no direct link between s and d, i.e. all the transmit-
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Figure 4.1 In the 1st hop of each transmission, s multicasts the useful
message xtr and the fake ones xi=tr’s towards N sectors. In the 2nd
hop, the K relays retransmit their received messages towards d
ted information should be forwarded by the relays. To perform the proposed security method,
s and d should share the CSI knowledge of the source-trusted relay-destination link, which is
the kernel of our developed security method. This CSI is considered to be the main cause of
randomness and it is completely mapped into a vector V of digital values. It should be noted
that this security algorithm is implemented just before the communication process starts, and
it can be renewed at any time s and d agree on to keep refreshing the source of security and to
make it as strong as possible. Moreover, since the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in an
AF two-hop wireless network over the ﬁrst hop is higher than the received SNR after two hops.
Therefore, by considering the case where the eavesdropper is in the ﬁrst hop, we are studying
the worst case security scenario. In the ﬁrst hop, the source will encode the data prior to the
transmission by using the vector V . Then, s will use this vector again to map its transmission
of the different messages xi’s towards N different sectors, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N, N ∈ N+. We will
denote the desired encoded signal by xtr, whereas the other signals xi=tr are the fake ones that
are transmitted over the other sectors. Without the knowledge of V , each untrusted relay e will
try to randomly guess the useful signal with a probability 1/N. Even if it succeeds in guessing
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and receiving the useful message, the untrusted relay would still need the vector V to decode
it. In the second phase, all the K relays will resend their received messages towards d using the
DBF technique. Since it has the same vector V , after removing the interference coming from
the fake messages by using self-interference cancellation (SIC), the destination will be able to
know from which sector the useful message is coming and decode it using V . The received
signal, at the kth relay, where 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is given by
yk =
√
Pi hs,k xi+nk, (4.1)
where nk ∼Nc
(
0,σ2
)
is the complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the kth relay,
with mean 0 and variance σ2, Pi is the transmitted power from s towards the ith sector. We
assumed that the channels are quasi-static block log-normal channels, i.e. the channel coef-
ﬁcient hv,r ∼ lnN (μv,σ2v ), where {v,r} ⊂ {{s,k},{k,d}}, is considered as constant during
the transmission time of one message, but it may change independently thereafter, the CSI is
known by the receiving nodes, and the noise variance N0 has the same value in the ﬁrst and
the second phases. It is important to note that adopting such security solution by allowing a
part of the nodes to forward fake messages is feasible due to the availability of a high number
of electronic sensors with limited capabilities. Consequently, the received signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR), at a kth relay, is expressed as
γk = ρs
∣∣hs,k∣∣2, (4.2)
where ρ j
Δ
=Pj
/
N0, j ∈ {s,k,e}. In the second hop, the retransmitted message from the kth relay
will be χk = αk wk yk, where wk is the beamforming weight, and αk represents the normalized
amplifying coefﬁcient αk = 1√
ρs |hs,k|2+N0
. The received useful messages at d will be written as
yd =
M
∑
m=1
hm,d αmwm ym+nd, (4.3)
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where M is the number of the relays in the sector that receives the right message. 1 ≤ m≤M,
nd ∼Nc (0,N0) is the complex AWGN at d. After optimizing the beamforming weights from
Kim et al. (2015) and the references therein, the SNR at the destination is obtained as
γd =
M
∑
m=1
ρs |hs,m|2 ρm
∣∣hm,d∣∣2
ρs |hs,m|2+ρm
∣∣hm,d∣∣2+1
=
M
∑
m=1
γm. (4.4)
The channel capacity at d will be
Cd =
[
1
2
log(1+ γd)
]+
, (4.5)
where [ξ ]+ denotes max{ξ ,0}.
4.3.1 Non Colluding Eavesdropping Relays
In this scenario, there are two different hypotheses H1 and H2 as follows :
Hypothesis H1: the untrusted relay is in the right sector with a probability p1 = 1/N and it
knows how to recover V and decode the message.
Hypothesis H2: the untrusted relay is in a wrong sector, with a probability p0 = 1− p1 =
1−1/N. Then, this relay will not impact the security and the channel capacity at the eaves-
dropper e will be equivalent to zero from a security point of view. Considering the aforemen-
tioned two hypotheses, the channel capacity at e will be expressed as
Ce =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2 log(1+ γe) H1
0 H2,
(4.6)
where γe = ρs |hs,e|2 is the SNR of the useful message at e.
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4.3.2 Colluding Eavesdropping Relays
Assuming aggressive untrusted relays, cooperating between each other and sending their mes-
sages towards an external wire-tapper A, the received useful signal at A will be written as
yA =
U1
∑
u=1
hu,A αuwu yu+nA, (4.7)
whereU1 is the number of the untrusted relays that are in the right sector and sending the useful
messages xtr, and 1 ≤ u ≤U1 ≤U . Moreover, nA ∼Nc (0,N0) is the complex AWGN at A.
Hence, the SNR at A will become
γA =
U1
∑
u=1
ρs |hs,u|2 ρu
∣∣hu,A∣∣2
ρs |hs,u|2+ρu
∣∣hu,A∣∣2+1
= ∑U1u=1 γu. (4.8)
We will deﬁne two hypotheses for A:
Hypothesis H
′
1: A receives the right message with a probability p1 = 1/N and knows how to
recover V and decodes the message.
Hypothesis H
′
2: the colluding relays are just in the wrong sectors, or A con not recoverV , which
means that A won’t have any impact on the security. Hence, the channel capacity at A will be
equivalent to
CA =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2 log(1+ γA) H
′
1
0 H
′
2,
(4.9)
We will deﬁne the worst security case as when e, (in the non colluding state), or A, (in the
colluding state), knows how to recover V and decode the message. Therefore, the channel
capacity at q, where q ∈ {e,A}, is given as
Cq =
[
1
N
.
1
2
log(1+ γq)
]+
. (4.10)
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From (4.5) and (4.10), the general secrecy capacity expression of the worst case is calculated
as
CS,q =
[
Cd −Cq
]+
=
[
1
2
log(1+ γd)− 12N log
(
1+ γq
)]+
. (4.11)
4.4 Secrecy Outage Probability
Theorem 5. The secrecy outage probability expression of our proposed method CS,q, for both
passive and aggressive untrusted relays scenarios, is expressed as
Pr
[
CS,q < R
]
=
2
3
Φ
((
ln
(
22R
(
1+ eμq
) 1
N −1
)
−μd
)
σ−1d
)
+
1
6
Φ
((
ln
(
22R
(
1+ e(μq+
√
3σq)
) 1
N −1
)
−μd
)
σ−1d
)
−1
6
Φ
((
ln
(
22R
(
1+ e(μq−
√
3σq)
) 1
N −1
)
−μd
)
σ−1d
)
. (4.12)
Proof. From (4.11), and for a threshold R, the SOP is deﬁned as Kim et al. (2015)
Pr
[
CS,q < R
]
= Pr
[
1
2
log(1+ γd)− 12N log
(
1+ γq
)
< R
]
(4.13)
= Pr
[
γd < 22R
(
1+ γq
) 1
N −1
]
=
∞∫
0
Fγd
(
22R
(
1+ γq
) 1
N −1
)
fγq
(
γq
)
d γq.
Since γq and γd are following a log-normal distribution, (please refer to Appendix II for
the proof), then their probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function
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(CDF) are given as follows
fX(x;μ,σ) =
1
xσ
√
2π
e−
(lnx−μ)2
2σ2 , (4.14)
FX(x;μ,σ) =Φ
(
lnx−μ
σ
)
, (4.15)
and Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Thus, the SOP in (4.13) is obtained as
Pr
[
CS,q < R
]
= (4.16)
=
∞∫
0
Φ
⎛
⎜⎝ ln
(
22R
(
1+ γq
) 1
N −1
)
−μd
σd
⎞
⎟⎠ e−
(lnγq−μq)2
2σq2
γq σq
√
2π
d γq.
Let β = ln
(
γq
)
, then γq = eβ , and d γq = eβ dβ . (4.17)
β is a normally distributed r.v. β ∼ N (μq,σ2q ). Substituting (4.17) in (4.16), the secrecy
outage probability Pr
[
CS,q < R
]
is written as
∞∫
0
ψ(β )︷ ︸︸ ︷
Φ
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
ln
(
22R
(
1+ eβ
) 1
N −1
)
−μd
σd
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ e
− (β−μq)
2
2σq2
σq
√
2π
dβ . (4.18)
It is noticed that (4.18) denotes the expectation of ψ (β ). We will use Holtzman tool Holtz-
man (1992) to approximate E [ψ (β )] in terms of three points located at μq, μq+
√
3σq and
μq−
√
3σq as follows
Pr
[
CS,q < R
]
= E [ψ (β )] =
2
3
ψ
(
μq
)
+
1
6
ψ
(
μq+
√
3σq
)
− 1
6
ψ
(
μq−
√
3σq
)
. (4.19)
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Compensating ψ (β ) from (4.18) in (4.19) yields (4.12).
4.5 Simulation Results
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Figure 4.2 SOP with passive untrusted relays: R= 3 bps/Hz, M = 4,
σs = σk = 0.95 and μs = μk = 1
In this section, we demonstrate the validity of our derived results using MATLAB software.
Fig.4.2 shows the SOP as a function of the SNR. It is noticed that the derived expressions
accurately characterize the simulation results. It is assumed that R = 3 bps/Hz, M = 4, σs =
σk = 0.95 and μs = μk = 1. From Fig.4.2, we can see how the secrecy performance improves
when the number of sectors N is increased. For example, to keep the SOP level at 10−2,
the source has to increase the number of sectors N from 4 to 8, which will also reduces the
required SNR from 23dB to 17dB. Also, it is shown that our performed technique outperforms
the conventional jamming technique, where the destination jams the nodes while the source is
transmitting in the ﬁrst hop. As we can see from Fig.4.2, the margin between the worst and the
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Figure 4.3 SOP with aggressive untrusted relays: R= 2 bps/Hz, M = 4,
σs = σk = 1.1 and μs = μk = 0.69
best case, when e does not know how to recover V , depends on e’s capability in recovering V
and decoding the message.
Fig.4.3 shows the SOP of our proposed technique for different values of N, when R= 2 bps/Hz,
σs = σk = 1.1, and μs = μk = 0.69. It can be seen that the greater the number of sectors,
the better the secrecy performance. Moreover, we can see from Fig.4.3 that there is not that
much of difference between the base of one and that of three aggressive untrusted relays. For
example, at SNR level of 18dB, the SOP just goes from 1.05×10−2 to 1.85×10−2 after adding
two extra aggressive untrusted relays, which means that our proposed technique is immune
towards adding more eavesdropping relays that are cooperating with each other. Also, it is
shown that the security performance is improved when our technique is applied compared to
the jamming technique. To evaluate the diversity order, we calculated the slope at 20dB for the
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following cases: when all the relays are trusted, the brown curve in Fig. 3.2, and when all the
relays are untrusted and aggressive, the blue curve in Fig. 3.4. For the ﬁrst case, the slope is
1.1, whereas it becomes 0.7 for the second case.
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new location-based multicasting protocol that is mapped by the
knowledge of a trusted link’s CSI in two-hops WSN. We provided an analytical study for the
SOP for the passive and the aggressive behaviors of the untrusted relays. The results showed
the immunity of our technique towards the untrusted relays aggressive behavior, and an im-
provement in the security compared to the conventional jamming technique.
CHAPTER 5
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5.1 Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security performance over Rayleigh fading
channels in the presence of impulsive noise, as encountered, for instance, in smart grid en-
vironments. For this scheme, secrecy performance metrics are considered with and without
destination assisted jamming at the eavesdropper’s side. Speciﬁcally, we derive analytical ex-
pressions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP), at the legitimate receiver. Finally, numerical
results are provided to verify the accuracy of our derivations. From the obtained results, it is
veriﬁed that the SOP, without destination assisted jamming, is ﬂooring at high signal-to-noise-
ratio values and that it can be signiﬁcantly improved with the use of jamming.
5.2 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)’s are widely employed in oil, gas, and smart grid (SG)
mediums, since they have tremendously reduced the costs, increased the network coverage,
and reduced the deployment time Gungor et al. (2010); Akyildiz et al. (2002). For example,
in the context of designing a reliable smart grid, it is crucial to monitor and control the power
system parameters in the transmission and distribution segments as well as in substation de-
vices Fang et al. (2012). In order to allow such advanced functionalities and to avoid possible
disruptions in electric systems due to unexpected failures, a highly reliable, scalable, secure,
cost-effective, and robust communication network must be operational within the power grid
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that convey data from monitoring sensors in the ﬁeld to the access point. In this vein, the most
promising method of SG monitoring, explored in the literature, is based on WSN’s Gungor
et al. (2011). For such applications, the increase in the inﬁltration rate for smart sensor net-
works has raised concerns regarding their security and privacy. Therefore, creating a secure
environment for communications, and guaranteeing the privacy of customers, is becoming a
signiﬁcant challenge in SG environments. Since the infrastructures tend to be highly diversi-
ﬁed, especially with the continuous deployment of small sensors Baig & Amoudi (2013), the
lower layers (physical and data link layer) are oblivious of any security considerations. In this
vein, to tackle the security issues, physical layer security (PLS) was suggested as a potential
solution Soosahabi & Naraghi-Pour (2012). Recently, many security methods were studied in
the PLS ﬁeld, like game theory , multiple antenna schemes , beamforming , cooperative jam-
ming , and power allocation techniques Atallah et al. (2015). Particularly, cooperative jamming
strategies have been deemed efﬁcient for reliable secure transmission over wireless mediums
Atallah et al. (2015); Atallah & Kaddoum (2016, 2017); Liu et al. (2013).
5.3 Related Work
In the literature, multiple researches have been depicting the performance of cooperative jam-
ming strategies in the presence of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). However, the noise
characteristics usually observed in SG environments are remarkably non-Gaussian and are in-
herently impulsive Middleton (1977); Sarr et al. (2017); Neagu & Hamouda (2016). For exam-
ple, the noise, emitted from power equipments in a power substation, appeared to be impulsive
et al (2011). On the other hand, the performance of PLS techniques, in the presence of impul-
sive noise, is not widely acknowledged. In Pittolo & Tonello (2013), the secrecy rate was
studied in narrowband power line communications (PLC) networks taking correlated channels
into consideration. Thereafter, Pittolo & Tonello (2014) evaluated the security in PLC networks
with multi-carrier and multi-user broadcast channels. Both Pittolo & Tonello (2013) and Pit-
tolo & Tonello (2014) showed that a higher secrecy rate could be achieved when deploying
wireless channels, rather than utilizing the PLC links. In Salem et al. (2017), the researchers
71
proposed a PLC and wireless hybrid security scheme. However, the analysis in Salem et al.
(2017) is limited to AWGN only and the effect of impulsive noise is ignored. In Liu et al.
(2013), the authors studied two-hops wireless networks, with destination assisted jamming, in
the presence of an eavesdropper. In their work, both the destination and the transmitter are
jamming the eavesdropper. However, the practical case of impulsive noise, whether at the
legitimate receiver or at the eavesdropper’s side, has not been investigated.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no existing work has considered PLS in wireless sys-
tems, where the effect of the impulsive noise was involved. To fulﬁll this research gap, our
paper provides a mathematical framework to investigate the performance of PLS in the pres-
ence of impulsive noise. Here, we consider a Bernoulli-Gaussian (BG) noise model, to take into
account the impulsive behavior. This is motivated by the facts that the BG model is tractable
and can represent the amplitude distributions of real impulsive noise measurements to a certain
level of satisfaction Shongwey et al. (2014). We consider a single input single output (SISO)
communication network, which consists of a source, a destination, and a passive eavesdropper.
The passive eavesdropper is trying to intercept the transmitted message between the source and
the destination without interfering with the system. To study the secrecy performance in this
system, we consider two scenarios: 1) with destination assisted jamming, where the destination
is jamming the eavesdropper while the source is transmitting its signal, and 2) without destina-
tion assisted jamming, which is the worst security case. In this network, the wireless channels
have a Rayleigh distribution and the noise is characterized by a Bernoulli-Gaussian random
process Ghosh (1996), to capture the combined effects of the AWGN and the impulsive noise.
Our main contributions summarized are as follows:
- We analyze the secrecy performance of the proposed network in smart grid scenarios, in the
presence of impulsive noise.
- We reformulate the secrecy capacity in an alternative approach aiming to make the deriva-
tion of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) tractable.
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- We also analyze and compare the secrecy outage performance under two different scenar-
ios: i) with destination assisted jamming, where the destination assists by jamming the
passive eavesdropper while the source is transmitting its signal, and ii) without considering
destination assisted jamming.
- We provide accurate results, in terms of the achievable secrecy capacity and the SOP, for
these scenarios. Subsequently, numerical simulations are used to verify the accuracy of our
analytical expressions.
5.4 System Model and Problem Formulation
Figure 5.1 The source s transmits xs to the destination d, while the
eavesdropper e is trying to intercept xs. In the case where d is jamming, d is
provided with two independent antennas; (1) is for receiving xs. (2) is for
jamming with artiﬁcial noise signal xd
As shown in Fig. 5.1, a wireless communication system consists of a source s, a destination
d, and a passive eavesdropper e. In the demonstrated network, two scenarios can occur; in
the ﬁrst one, the source is broadcasting its signal xs, and both the destination and the passive
eavesdropper are receiving it. The destination has two independent antennas; one is jamming
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the passive eavesdropper, with an artiﬁcial noise signal xd , while the other one is receiving
the signal, coming from the source. In the second scenario, there is no destination assisted
jamming. Thus, the received signals, at the destination and at the eavesdropper’s sides, are
respectively expressed by
y′d = hs,d
√
Psxs+hdin
√
Pdxd +nd, (5.1)
ye = hs,e
√
Psxs+hd,e
√
Pdxd +ne, (5.2)
where Ps is the source transmit power and Pd is the artiﬁcial noise signal xd power. Also, hs,d
is the channel coefﬁcient between the source and the destination and hdin is the channel co-
efﬁcient between the jamming and the receiving antenna at the destination side. In addition,
nd and ne are respectively the noise terms at the destination and the eavesdropper, that cap-
ture the combined effects of AWGN and impulsive interferers. In a speciﬁc situation, where
no jamming is used at the eavesdropper’s side, Pd in (5.2) will be equal to zero. In our anal-
ysis, we assume that the channels are quasi-static block Rayleigh channels, i.e. the channel
coefﬁcients hs,e, hs,d , hdin, and hd,e are considered as constant during the transmission time of
one message, but they may change independently thereafter. Accordingly, the channel gains
|hs,e|2,
∣∣hs,d∣∣2, |hdin|2, and ∣∣hd,e∣∣2 follow independent exponential distributions. For this model,
the thermal noise component at node m, where m ∈ {e,d}, is considered complex Gaussian,
whereas the impulsive part is modeled as a Bernoulli-complex Gaussian random process Ghosh
(1996). Since it is a sum of two complex Gaussian random processes, nm qualiﬁes as a complex
Gaussian noise and can be written as Dubey & Mallik (2015),
nm = nm0+nm1, (5.3)
where nm0 is the AWGN component at node m, with zero mean and variance σ2m0, and nm1 =
bmAm is the impulsive component. Moreover, Am is a complex white Gaussian noise, with zero
mean and variance σ2m1, and bm is the Bernoulli process. The probability mass function of bm
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is given by,
Pr(bm = 1) = pm1,
Pr(bm = 0) = pm0 = 1− pm1, (5.4)
where pm1 and pm0 denote the probabilities of occurrence of the impulsive and the thermal
noise at node m, respectively. Thus, the noise variance of nm can be written as
Nm = σ20 +bm σ
2
m . (5.5)
At the destination side, due to the large power difference between xs and xd , .i.e. xd  xs, the
destination will be able to use successive interference cancellation (SIC) to remove xd . Hence,
after using SIC, the signal at the destination will be given by
yd = hs,d
√
Psxs+nd. (5.6)
Then, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR), at node m, can be expressed
as
γm =
Ps |hs,m|2
Pd
∣∣hd,m∣∣2+Nm
=
Ps |hs,m|2
Pd
∣∣hd,m∣∣2+σ2m0+bm σ2m1
=
Ps |hs,m|2
Pd
∣∣hd,m∣∣2+σ2m0 (1+bmΓm) , (5.7)
where Γm =
σ2m1
σ2m0
. By dividing the nominator and the denominator by σ2m0, the SINR γm becomes
γm =
γm0
γ j+1+bmΓm
, (5.8)
where γ j =
Pd
∣∣hd,e∣∣2
σ2e0
, and γm0 =
Ps |hs,m|2
σ2m0
. (5.9)
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Thus, from (5.8), the channel capacity at node m becomes
Cm = log2 (1+ γm)
= log2
(
1+
γm0
γ j+1+bmΓm
)
. (5.10)
Finally, the achievable secrecy capacity would be given by
Cs = [Cd−Ce]+
=
[
log2
(
1+
γd0
1+bd Γd
)
− log2
(
1+
γe0
γ j+1+beΓe
)]+
, (5.11)
where [a]+ = max(a,0). As a consequence, in the following section, we detail the derivations
of the secrecy outage probability equations to study the impact of impulsive noise on the PLS.
The analysis considers both cases: with and without destination assisted jamming.
5.5 Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis
It is important to mention that a secrecy outage event happens when the target secrecy R is
greater than the achievable secrecy capacity Cs, i.e., Cs < R. For the two scenarios, the analyt-
ical expressions of the SOP can be found as
Pr [Cs < R] = Pr [log2 (1+ γd)− log2 (1+ γe)< R] . (5.12)
5.5.1 Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis with Jamming
In this subsection, we study the SOP after applying destination assisted jamming.
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Theorem 6. With jamming, the secrecy outage probability in Rayleigh fading channels, in the
presence of impulsive noise, is given by
Pr [Cs < R] =
1
∑
i=0
pdi
1
∑
k=0
pek
(
a1 exp(a2)E1 (a3)+ γd0γ j
)
γd0γ j
, (5.13)
where a1,a2, and a3 are given in (5.19), (5.20), and (5.22), respectively. Also, E1 (x) is the ex-
ponential integral function of the random variable (r.v.) x and deﬁned as E1 (x) =
∫ ∞
1
exp(−tx)
t dt.
Proof. From (5.11) and (5.12), the SOP is demonstrated as
Pr [Cs < R] = Pr
[
1+ γd01+bd Γd
1+ γe
<2R
]
= Pr
[(
1+
γd0
1+bd Γd
)
< 2R (1+ γe)
]
= 1−Pr
[
2R (1+ γe)<
(
1+
γd0
1+bd Γd
)]
= 1−Pr
[
γe <
(
1+
γd0
1+bd Γd
)
2−R−1
]
= 1−
1
∑
i=0
pdi
∞∫
0
Fϒe
((
1+
γd0
1+bdiΓd
)
1
2R
−1
)
fϒd0(γd0)d γd0, (5.14)
where Fϒe(γe) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γe, which is given as
Fϒe(γe) = Pr(ϒe < γe)
= Pr
( γe0
γ j+1+beΓe
< γe
)
= Pr
(
γe0 < γe
(
γ j+1+beΓe
))
=
1
∑
k=0
pek
∞∫
0
Fϒe0
(
γe
(
γ j+1+bekΓe
))
fϒ j
(
γ j
)
d γ j
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=
1
∑
k=0
pek
∞∫
0
(
1− exp
(
γe
(
γ j+1+bekΓe
)
γe0
))
exp
(
− γ jγ j
)
γ j
d γ j
=
1
∑
k=0
pek
⎛
⎝−γe0 exp
(
− γe(1+bekΓe)γe0
)
− γ j γe−γe0
γe γ j+ γe0
⎞
⎠ . (5.15)
Since γm0 follows an exponential distribution, the probability density function (PDF) and the
CDF of γm0 are given by Alouini & Goldsmith (1999):
fϒm0 (γm0) =
e−γm0
/
γm0
γm0
, (5.16)
Fϒm0 (γm0) = 1− exp
(
−γm0γm0
)
, (5.17)
where γm0 is the mean of γm0. Substituting (5.15) and (5.16) in (5.14), the SOP with jamming
can be written as
Pr [Cs < R] = 1−
1
∑
i=0
pdi
∞∫
0
⎛
⎝exp
(−γd0
γd0
)
γd0
1
∑
k=0
pek
×
⎛
⎝−γe0 exp
(
− γe(1+bekΓe)γe0
)
− γ j γe−γe0
γe γ j+ γe0
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠d γd0
=
1
γd0γ j
1
∑
i=0
pdi
1
∑
k=0
pek
(
a1 exp(a2)E1 (a3)+ γd0γ j
)
, (5.18)
where a1 =−γe0 2R (1+bdiΓd) , (5.19)
a2 =
z2+bdiΓd γ j+bekΓe γd0+ γd0+ γ j
γd0γ j
, (5.20)
z2 =−
(
γ j− γe0
)
(1+bdiΓd)2R, (5.21)
a3 =
z3+ z4− γd0γ j (1+bekΓe)
γ jγe0γd0
, (5.22)
z3 =
(
γe0 (1+bdiΓd)
(
γe0− γ j
)
4R+γd0γ j (1+bekΓe)
)
2R
, (5.23)
z4 =
(
bekΓe γd0+bdiΓd γ j+ γd0+ γ j
)
γe0. (5.24)
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5.5.2 Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis without Jamming
Here, we consider the worst security case, without destination assisted jamming, to measure
the security performance of our proposed scenario.
Theorem 7. Without jamming, the secrecy outage probability in Rayleigh fading channels, in
the presence of impulsive noise, is given by
Pr [Cs < R] =
1
∑
i=0
pdi
1
∑
k=0
pek
×
⎛
⎝1− exp
(
1−2R(1+bdiΓd)
γd0
)
(1+bekΓe)γd0
(1+bekΓe)γd0+2R (1+bdiΓd)γe0
⎞
⎠ . (5.25)
Proof. Without jamming, Pd = 0, then γ j in (5.9) is equal to zero, and (5.11) is further simpli-
ﬁed. Revisiting (5.12), the SOP, under this condition, becomes
Pr [Cs < R] = Pr
[
log2
(
1+ γd01+bd Γd
1+ γe
)
< R
]
= Pr
[
γd0 <
(
2R (1+ γe)−1
)
(1+bd Γd)
]
. (5.26)
By substituting (5.16) and (5.17) in (5.26), we can write the SOP as
Pr [Cs < R] =
1
∑
i=0
pdi
1
∑
k=0
pek
∞∫
0
Fϒd0 (z1) fϒe0(γe0)d γe0 (5.27)
=
1
∑
i=0
pdi
1
∑
k=0
pek
∞∫
0
(
1− exp
(−z1
γd0
)) exp(−γe0γe0
)
γe0
d γe0 (5.28)
=
1
∑
i=0
pdi
1
∑
k=0
pek
⎛
⎝1− exp
(
1−2R(1+bdiΓd)
γd0
)
(1+bekΓe)γd0
(1+bekΓe)γd0+2R (1+bdiΓd)γe0
⎞
⎠ (5.29)
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where z1 in (5.27) becomes
z1 =
(
2R
(
1+
γe0
1+bekΓe
)
−1
)
(1+bdiΓd). (5.30)
Although this paper considers the secrecy analysis for the case of memoryless impulsive noise,
modeled by a Bernoulli-Gaussian process, the analysis could be easily extended to consider
the presence of any kind of impulsive or Gaussian mixture noise.
5.6 Simulation Results
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Figure 5.2 Analytical and simulated SOP performances of the proposed
system without jamming: γd0 = γe0, Γd = Γe = 1000,∣∣hs,d∣∣2 = |hs,e|2 = ∣∣hd,e∣∣2 = 1, and R= 1bps/Hz
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Figure 5.3 Analytical and simulated SOP performances of the proposed
system with jamming:
∣∣hs,d∣∣2 = |hs,e|2 = ∣∣hd,e∣∣2 = 1, Γd = Γe = 100, γd0 = γe0,
γ j = 12γd0, and R= 1bps/Hz
In this section, we present the SOP performances of SG networks, with and without destination
assisted jamming. In the simulation results, performed using MATLAB software, it is assumed
that the probability of having impulsive noise Pm1, ranges from 0.01 to 0.1, and Γm takes the
values 100 and 1000. These values are chosen to represent the characteristics of the impulsive
noise, as observed in SG environments Middleton (1977). On the other hand, it is also assumed
that the threshold R = 1bps/Hz, Eb/N0 = γd0 = γe0, γ j = 12γd0,
∣∣hs,d∣∣2 = |hs,e|2 = ∣∣hd,e∣∣2 = 1,
and the background noise σ2d0 = σ
2
e0 = 1.
Fig.5.2 shows the analytical results derived in (5.25), and simulated SOP performances with-
out destination assisted jamming. From Fig.5.2, it is seen that the analytical results perfectly
match the simulations. Moreover, we can observe that the security performance is directly
proportional to the impulsive noise at the eavesdropper, and is inversely proportional to the
impulsive noise at the destination. We also exposed that when Eb/N0 > 25dB, the security
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is ﬂooring; due to the effect of the noise becoming negligible, and therefore, the SOP scales
towards a constant value.
Fig.5.3 shows the analytical results given in (5.13), and simulated SOP performances when
considering destination assisted jamming. This ﬁgure further conﬁrms the correctness of the
analysis through the simulations. From Fig.5.3, We can see the degradation in the security per-
formance due to the presence of the impulsive noise. Subsequently, compared to Fig.5.2, it is
also observed that by adding jamming, the security performance is remarkably enhanced. This
conﬁrms that the destination assisted jamming technique can be beneﬁcial to SG environments.
5.7 Conclusions
We have presented the SOP expressions, in wireless SG environments, with and without des-
tination assisted jamming. Our analytical expressions allow the measurement of the security
performance; when either both of the destination and the wiretapper or any of them is affected
by impulsive noise. From the obtained results, we veriﬁed that the analytical results agree with
the simulations. We also showed that the achievable security is enhanced when the occurrence
probability of impulsive noise is higher at the eavesdropper’s side than at the legitimate re-
ceiver. Moreover, the results show that destination assisted jamming can signiﬁcantly enhance
the security of the network, making it a promising security solution for SG networks. In
this paper, we didn’t consider any aggressive action by the eavesdropper, which would be an
interesting topic for future works.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis concentrated on the security in the physical layer in wireless networks. The en-
vironment’s characteristics were exploited to provide secure protocols in wireless systems. A
jamming technique was applied in most of the works, whether to analyse its presence, to add
more security to the studied systems, or to compare its performance with our novel protocols
to show the superiority of our protocols against the conventional jamming technique. The do-
main was exploited to design spatial transmission protocols. Rayleigh and log-normal fadings
were considered. Also, the presence of impulsive noise has been investigated. The proposed
protocols showed their strength against the eavesdroppers’ passive and colluding behaviors.
Finally, a novel approach to study the security performance in impulsive noise environments is
proposed and analysed. Hence, we investigated the secrecy capacity scaling with the presence
of colluding eavesdroppers in large wireless networks. To reduce the probability of having
access to the whole message by the eavesdroppers, we proposed new location based protocols
for that purpose. Our techniques were liberated from the need to know the CSI or the location
of the eavesdroppers. Also, by exploiting the presence of having many trusted nodes in large
wireless networks, we proposed a novel key generating and mapping technique. In addition,
we provided new secrecy capacity expressions for the environments that are affected by the
impulsive noise. Thus, from the second chapter, we showed how the secrecy performance
was enhanced after applying cooperative jamming technique, and how the distributed beam-
forming overcomes the opportunistic relaying technique for large number of relays. However,
opportunistic relaying can still be used for small number of relays and its performance could
be enhanced by increasing the transmitted power. In the third chapter, a novel location based
protocol was proposed to reduce the probability that an eavesdropper will receive the whole
transmitted message. Even though the multicasting technique is applied in each transmission
time, the secrecy capacity scaling was not just similar, but also slightly better than the broad-
casting technique applied in the second chapter. We applied cooperative jamming technique
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along with our proposed protocol to boost the security. The results showed how increasing
the number of the sectors or the number of the relays could remarkably enhance the security
performance. Our proposed protocol could be exploited to optimize the selection strategy of
the sectors to avoid choosing the weak clusters and to focus on the stronger ones. Since the
passive behavior of the eavesdroppers was considered in this chapter, there was a need to in-
vestigate in the colluding behavior to provide the most secure protocol for wireless networks.
Thus, we proposed a new key mapping technique, in the fourth chapter, that was proved to
be immune towards the colluding behavior of the untrusted eavesdroppers. This protocol also
exploited the presence of the large number of trusted relays to generate keys to encode the
transmitted signals and to map the transmission towards different clusters. By applying this
protocol, the destination and the relays can beneﬁt from the transmitted power in all the sectors
to harvest the energy. Here, the destination didn’t need to drain its energy by jamming the
relays. That’s due to the fact that our proposed protocol is strong enough to be operated by
itself and to achieve good security results. Furthermore, This protocol is promising due to the
availability of high number of cheap electronic sensor nodes. In another topic, since the smart
grid environment suffers from the impulsive noise, we provided in the ﬁfth chapter the secrecy
analyses for two cases: before and after applying the destination assisted jamming technique,
with the presence of impulsive noise. Besides reformulating the secrecy capacity equations, we
showed in our results that the impulsive noise has an impact on the security since it’s affect-
ing both the destination and the eavesdropper, which means that implementing good impulsive
noise receivers could be taken into consideration to enhance the security performance. Also,
the results showed how the security was enhanced after applying destination assisted jamming
technique, especially for the systems that are transmitting with high power. It should be noted
that the simulations in this thesis were performed using MATLAB software.
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6.1 Future Work
As extensions to the current works, the imperfect CSI could be considered in the future studies
to cover more general cases. The full duplex mode could be investigated, whether at the trans-
mitter, the receiver or at the relays to see its impact on the security with our proposed security
protocols. Moreover, analysing and comparing the cooperation strategies when the relays are
decoding and forwarding or compressing and forwarding the information could also be con-
sidered, especially since these relays will have different capabilities and permissions on the
access to the information. The aggressive behaviour of the eavesdroppers when they cooperate
together to intercept the transmitted messages could be analysed to show its effect on some
of the proposed protocols. Our proposed security techniques, that rely on the space diversity,
could be optimized by checking which sectors are the best to be chosen and which sectors
should be avoided whether from the power or the security perspective. Multi-antennas tech-
niques could be applied and investigated at both the legitimate and illegitimate nodes. The case
where the eavesdroppers are attacking the network by jamming the legitimate nodes could also
be investigated whether to ﬁnd alternative ways to route the transmitted information or other
solutions to reduce the attack effect on the legitimate nodes. Moreover, the impulsive noise
environments could beneﬁt from a deeper investigation and analysis in the context of several
physical layer security techniques. Deep or reinforcement learning could be implemented to
detect jamming behavior. Additionally, more research efforts need to be focused towards ex-
ploiting relay positioning and cross layered scenarios, which this latter could be used to gain
more beneﬁts from secure cooperative schemes.

APPENDIX I
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
1. Proof of Lemma1
1. Here, we will prove that A= ∑Kk=1min
{
γs,k,2γk,d
}
has the PDF given in (3.21)
Lemma 2. Let Y = min
{
γs,k,2γk,d
}
’s, then Y is an exponentially distributed r.v. with a
rate parameter λ0 = 1ρ σ21
+ 1
2ρ σ22
.
Proof. Since γs,k and 2γk,d are exponentially distributed r.v.’s, their PDF and CDF will
be respectively given by the following equations Alouini & Goldsmith (1999)
fϒ (γ) = λe
−λγ , (A I-1)
Fϒ (γ) = 1− exp(−λ γ) , (A I-2)
where λ is the rate of the exponentially distributed r.v. γ . Hence, to prove that Y has an
exponential distribution, we will ﬁrst ﬁnd the complement of the CDF of Y as follows; for
some v> 0,
Pr(Y > v) = Pr
(
min{γs,k,γk,d}> v
)
= Pr
(
γs,k > v,γk,d > v
)
=
(
1−Fγs,k (v)
)(
1−Fγk,d (v)
)
= e−λ1 v e−
λ2 v
2
= e−v
(
λ1+ λ22
)
. (A I-3)
Then, the CDF of y will be calculated as
FY (v) = 1−Pr(Y > v) = 1− e−v
(
λ1+
λ2
2
)
,
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where λ1 and λ2 are deﬁned in (3.23). We can see from (A I-3) that the CDF of Y has
exactly the form of the CDF of an exponentially distributed r.v. given in (A I-2), with a
rate parameter of λ0 = λ1+λ22 =
1
ρ σ21
+ 1
2ρ σ22
.
Since A is a sum of K exponential r.v.’s, it has a Gamma distribution with a shape parameter
K and a rate parameter λ0, and its PDF is given by (3.21).
2. Since γs,e γd,e follow exponential distributions, the forms of their CDF and PDF are re-
spectively given in (A I-1) and (A I-2). Thus, the CDF of a r.v. Ze =
γs,e
γd,e+1
is expressed
as
Pr [Z < u] = Pr
[
γs,e <
(
γd,e+1
)
u
]
=
∞∫
0
Fϒs,e
((
γd,e+1
)
u
)
fϒd,e
(
γd,e
)
d γd,e
=
∞∫
0
(
1− exp(−λ1 u(γd,e+1)))(λ2 e−λ1 γd,e)d γd,e
= 1− exp(−λ1 u) λ2λ1 u+λ2 . (A I-4)
where λ1 and λ2 are deﬁned in (3.23).
Since B= 1+ KT Z, the CDF of B is calculated as
FB (b) = Pr
[
1+
K
T
Z < b
]
= Pr
[
Z < (b−1) T
K
]
= 1− exp
[
−λ1 (b−1) TK
]
λ2
λ1 (b−1) TK +λ2
. (A I-5)
Thus, we completed the proof.
APPENDIX II
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
We will prove that γq and γd are following a log-normal distribution. First, we will deﬁne the
SNR γi, j as follows
γi, j = ρi
∣∣hi, j∣∣2, (A II-1)
where i ∈ {s,m} and j ∈ {m,e,d}.
Lemma 3. Let X ∼ lnN (μ,σ2), then aX ∼ lnN (μ + lna, σ2), and Xa ∼ lnN (aμ,a2 σ2),
a ∈ R.
From Lemma 3, where a= 2, the channel gain
∣∣hi, j∣∣2 ∼ lnN (2μγi, j ,4σ2γi, j). By using the prop-
erties in Lemma 3, we ﬁnd that γi, j ∼ lnN (μγi, j ,σ2γi, j), where μγi, j = 2μi+ ln(ρi), ln(ρi) =
ln(Pi)− ln(N0), and σ2γi, j = 4σi2. Hence, γe ∼ lnN (μγs,e ,σ2γs,e).
Now, we will ﬁnd the distribution of γm (4.4) with the following approximation for high SNRs,
as follows
γm=
γs,m γm,d
γs,m+γm,d+1
≈ γs,m γm,dγs,m+γm,d =
1
1
γs,m+
1
γm,d
=
1
z
, (A II-2)
where z= z1+z2, z1 = 1γs,m and z2 =
1
γm,d
.
Lemma 4. Let Xj ∼ lnN (μ j,σ2j ) are independent log-normally distributed variables with
varying σ and μ parameters, and Y = ∑nj=1Xj. Then the distribution of Y has no closed form
expression, but can be reasonably approximated by another log-normal distribution Z with
parametersFenton (1960)
μZ = ln
[
∑eμ j+σ
2
j /2
]
− σ2Z2 , (A II-3)
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σ2Z = ln
[
∑e
2μ j+σ
2
j (e
σ2j −1)
(∑e
μ j+σ2j /2)2
+1
]
. (A II-4)
Form Lemma 3, where a=−1, we ﬁnd that Z1 ∼ lnN (−μγs,m ,σ2γs,m) and Z2 ∼ lnN (−μγm,d ,σ2γm,d).
Also, from Lemma 4, Z ∼ lnN (μz,σ2z ), where
σz2 = ln
((
exp
(
σ2z1
)−1)/2+1) ,
μz = ln(2exp(μz1))+0.5
(
σ2z1 −σ2z
)
.
Thus, from Lemma 3 and (A II-2), we get γm ∼ lnN (μγm ,σ2γm), where a = −1, μγm = −μz,
and σ2γm = σ
2
z . From (4.4), since γd is a sum of many γm, we will again use Lemma 4 to ﬁnd
that γd ∼ lnN (μγd ,σ2γd), where
σd2 = ln
((
exp
(
σ2γm
)−1)/M+1) ,
μd = ln(M exp(μγm))+0.5
(
σ2γm −σ2d
)
.
Since the expressions of γu and γA in (4.8) are similar to γm and γd respectively, by following
the same steps, we show that γu ∼ lnN (μγm ,σ2γm) and γA ∼ lnN (μγA ,σ2γA) where
σA2 = ln
((
exp
(
σ2γm
)−1)/U1+1) ,
μA = ln(U1 exp(μγm))+0.5
(
σ2γm −σ2A
)
.
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1. Abstract
Security has always played a critical role in wireless cooperative communication systems de-
sign. Eavesdropping and jamming are two common threats to the information security in wire-
less networks. However, jamming can be used in a cooperative manner to enable a secure
communication link between the legitimate transmitter and the intended receiver. This paper
presents a comprehensive survey on different jamming methods used to enhance the physical
layer security. This survey outlines ﬁrst the underlying concept and challenges with respect to
security in wireless network design followed by a comprehensive literature review and anal-
ysis of jamming techniques with their applications in this ﬁeld. For each jamming protocol,
the paper categorizes different techniques within the existing literature by elaborating on their
application, and corresponding performances.
Keywords: Physical layer security, cooperative jamming, beamforming, power allocation,
artiﬁcial noise, multiple antennas, MIMO, game theory.
2. Introduction
Wireless communications is playing an integral part in our lives and also has a signiﬁcant
social impact. Privacy and conﬁdentiality with respect to the transmitted information over
the wireless medium becomes vital, especially for applications concerning medical informa-
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tion, e-banking, and e-commerce. However, wireless communications are often vulnerable to
eavesdropping and signal interception Hong et al. (2013). Many security tasks are involved
in wireless networks design, like integrity and conﬁdentiality checks, authentication, spectrum
access control Lou & Ren (2009); Shiu et al. (2011). Conﬁdentiality refers to the prevention
of unauthorized information disclosure. Integrity ensures that the transmitted information is
utilized and modiﬁed by the legitimate user. Authentication refers to the identity conﬁrmation
of different terminals. Spectrum access control refers to prevention of denial-of-service type
attacks. Conventionally, these security tasks are addressed mostly in the upper layers of the
network protocol stack using cryptographic encryption and decryption methods. When em-
ploying symmetric-key cryptosystems, the two users have to share a common private key to
encrypt and decrypt the conﬁdential message Hong et al. (2013). However, for the secret keys
sharing, this requires a secure channel or protocol. The difﬁculties in secret key distribution and
management Schneier (1998) lead to security vulnerabilities in wireless systems. Alternatively,
public-key cryptosystems allow the use of a public key for encryption and a separate private
key for decryption. The public key is available to all users whereas the private key is known
only to the receiver. However, the cryptographic methods rely on the computational hardness
on decrypting the message to achieve security when the secret key is not available. As the
computational power increases, e.g., with the development of quantum computers, the compu-
tational hardness of certain mathematical problems, for which the encryption and decryption
are based on, may no longer hold, causing many current cryptosystems to break downHong
et al. (2013). Many coding and signal processing techniques in the physical layer have been
developed in the recent years, to support and to further enhance security in wireless systems,
many researchers have made contributions to ﬁnd alternative security solutions to ﬁt the re-
quirements of the current and emerging wireless networks Goel & Negi (2008); Gopala et al.
(2008); Shannon (1949); Bloch & Barros (2011). Even though the fast channel variations and
the wireless medium’s broadcast nature may cause additional challenges, physical layer secu-
rity technique exploits the properties of the wireless transmissions to secure the communication
channel in a better wayHong et al. (2013).
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Interference, in general, is regarded as undesired phenomenon in wireless communications.
But in secure communications, interference can beneﬁt the system if it is used in a proper way.
The idea is to create an interference and put the eavesdropper in a disadvantage comparing to
the legitimate nodes Park et al. (2013). Several applications use interference to increase the
security in the physical layer, one of the security applications that has become a very common
and promising technique in the physical security ﬁeld is the cooperative jamming which is
accomplished by the friendly terminals in which one of the legitimate parties sacriﬁces his
entire rate to jam the eavesdropper.
In this paper a continuation and update of the recent achievements in the ﬁeld of physical
layer security is presented with emphasis on different jamming methods and protocols of such
schemes. Hence, our contribution can be summarized as follows:
1. Providing a brief overview of physical layer system model and the challenges in this ﬁeld.
2. Developing a literature review of the different jamming techniques within the existing
recent literature with their advantages and disadvantages, followed by a discussion on
their subsequent application.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. The concept of physical layer security is
depicted in Section 3. Cooperative Jamming and techniques to enhance physical layer security
via cooperative jamming are presented in section 4. Finally, the concluding remarks are given
in section 5.
3. Physical Layer security and cooperative jamming
3.1 Physical Layer Security
As shown in Fig. III-1, a generic wireless communication network model which consists of
three nodes is taken into consideration: the legitimate transmitter (Alice), the intended receiver
(Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve). The link between Alice and Bob is called the main channel,
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while the link between Alice and Eve is named as a wiretap channel. This model exempliﬁes
the speciﬁc features of most multi-user secure communication systems. The secrecy capacity
is deﬁned as the maximum achievable secrecy rate. In Bloch et al. (2008), the secrecy capacity
over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel Cs,A and Rayleigh fading channel Cs,R
are given by
Alice Bob
Eve
Figure-A III-1 Wireless wiretap system model
Cs,A =
[
1
2
log2
(
1+
P
σ2m
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1+
P
σ2w
)]+
, (A III-1)
Cs,R =
[
log2
(
1+
P|hm|2
σ2m
)
− log2
(
1+
P|hw|2
σ2w
)]+
, (A III-2)
where P is the transmitted power, σm and σw are the noise power of the main channel and
wiretap channel. hm and hw are the Rayleigh fading coefﬁcients of main channel and wiretap
channel respectively. [x]+ =max{0,x}. Also, the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNRs) at Bob
and Eve are deﬁned as γm = P|hm|
2
σ2m
and γw = P|hw|
2
σ2w
, respectively.
In Fig. III-2, an average secrecy capacity of Rayleigh fading channel is compared (equation (A
III-2)) with that of Gaussian wiretap channel (equation (A III-1)). Strikingly, one can observe
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that the secrecy capacity over Rayleigh fading channels is higher than that of an AWGN chan-
nel, in other words, we can use the fading property of the physical layer channel to decrease the
SNR of wiretap channel. Besides using the fading characteristics of wireless channel, many
other methods are applied to improve the secrecy performance of the wireless communication
systems. All the existing physical layer security methods in Shiu et al. (2011) are classiﬁed into
ﬁve major approaches: theoretical secrecy capacity, multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO)
channel, coding schemes (channel coding and network coding), power allocation, and signal
design (artiﬁcial noise). Additionally, cooperative relay Han et al. (2015); Wang et al. (2013a);
Chen et al. (2013), cooperative jamming Ibrahim et al. (2015) and energy harvesting Xing et al.
(2014) are other useful methods. Among the aforementioned methods, cooperative jamming
is a promising technique and has attracted signiﬁcant attention. It was originally proposed for
a multiple access wiretap channel, where multiple legitimate users wish to have simultaneous
secure communications with an intended receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper.
3.2 Cooperative jamming
Cooperative jamming is a special technique where artiﬁcial noise is introduced by a helpful
interferer to confuse the eavesdropper.
In the following section, we will introduce the cooperative jamming techniques which are
used to enhance the physical layer security. To improve the secrecy capacity, we should either
increase the legitimate receiver’s SNR or decrease the eavesdropper’s SNR. A natural approach
by which to achieve the latter (decreasing the eavesdropper’s SNR) is to introduce interferers
into the system.
3.3 Artiﬁcial Jamming Signals types
Cooperative jamming depends on creating the interference at the eavesdropper’s side, many
artiﬁcial jamming signals are used and could be divided into four categories Long et al. (2014):
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Figure-A III-2 Normalized average secrecy capacity versus γm, for
selected values of γw. The thicker lines correspond to the normalized
average secrecy rate capacity of Rayleigh fading channel while the thinner
lines correspond to the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel
1. Gaussian noise: which is the same as the additive noise at the receiver Bassily & Ulukus
(2013); He & Yener (2013); Zhang et al. (2011).
2. Jamming signals which are priory known at legitimate receivers, which has an impact only
on the eavesdropper’s performance. This type of signals is better than the previous one
because the jamming signals don’t affect the legitimate receiver Long et al. (2013); Dong
et al. (2011).
3. Random codewords of a public codebook which is known by all the nodes including the
eavesdroppers, so the legitimate receiver has the ability to decode and cancel the jamming
signals, even though it requires a complicated self-interference cancellation receiver to
decode the codewords Pierrot & Bloch (2011).
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4. Useful signals for the other legitimate nodes; like the downlink and the uplink of the
neighbouring cells Popovski & Simeone (2009), signals of multiple simultaneous source-
destination pairs Sheikholeslami et al. (2012), or signals of the invited cognitive ratio
users Stanojev & Yener (2011) and Stanojev & Yener. (2011), this type is difﬁcult to apply
because of the change of the multiple transmission pairs.
Many applications are used in conjunction with the cooperative jamming strategy to enhance
the performance and increase the security, these include the usage of multiple antennas, beam-
forming, game theory, and power allocation methods.
4. Application of cooperative jamming
4.1 Cooperative Jamming with Multiple Antennas and Beamforming
Many works apply multiple antennas method with cooperative jamming technique to enhance
the physical layer securityYang et al. (2013); Zhang et al. (2015); Li et al. (2014a); Wang
et al. (2014b); Banawan & Ulukus (2014); Xing et al. (2014); Vishwakarma & Chockalingam
(2014). The authors in Yang et al. (2013) assume a scenario that the base station has to send
multiple independent data streams to multiple legitimate users; during the transmission, many
eavesdroppers with multiple antennas have interests in the transmission stream of the base
station. The eavesdroppers may collude or not, and maximize the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) of the desired streams using the beamforming method. The cooperative
jammer will work on keeping the SINR at the eavesdroppers below a certain threshold level
to guarantee a conﬁdential transmission between the base station and the legitimate users.
Another scenario in Li et al. (2014a) studies the Gaussian wiretap channel’s secrecy capacity
aided by an external jammer. Each of the receiver and the transmitter has a single antenna,
while the jammer and the eavesdropper are equipped with multiple antennas. The authors in
Wang et al. (2014b) reveal a scenario for secure transmission within a two-hop amplify-and-
forward relay network scheme, such that for large number of antennas at the source, the ergodic
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secrecy capacity (ESC) is independent of the number of antennas; whereas, for a large number
of antennas at the destination, the ESC is dependent on the number of antennas.
Beamforming is a very efﬁcient method also when it is used with the cooperative jamming
technique. However, these two techniques are adopted separately in most worksWang et al.
(2013a); Tran & Kong (2014); Wang et al. (2013b); Han et al. (2015); Vishwakarma & Chock-
alingam (2014). In Wang et al. (2013a), a scheme with joint cooperative jamming and beam-
forming is proposed to enhance the security of a cooperative relay network, where part of the
nodes uses a distributed beamforming mechanism while the others jam the eavesdropper si-
multaneously. In Tran & Kong (2014), another scheme of using the beamforming is proposed;
by preventing the eavesdroppers from using the beamformers to suppress the jamming signals.
It uses also two orthogonal dimensions for transmitting and receiving signals. A hybrid coop-
erative jamming and beamforming scheme is proposed in Wang et al. (2013b) also; the idea is
in both cooperative transmission phases, some intermediate nodes relay the signals to the le-
gitimate receivers by adopting the beamforming distribution, while, simultaneously, the other
nodes jam the eavesdropper, which eventually leads in protection of the transmitted data. The
authors in Han et al. (2015) develop an optimal relay assignment algorithm to solve the se-
crecy capacity maximization problem, and a smart jamming algorithm is proposed to increase
the secrecy capacity of the system.
4.2 Cooperative jamming with Power Allocation method
Since the system’s performance in cooperative jamming depends highly on the jamming strat-
egy as well as the power level of the jamming Park et al. (2013), three power allocation strate-
gies are derived in Park et al. (2013) to minimize the outage probability of the secrecy rate,
besides that, three kinds of jamming power allocation schemes are proposed according to the
available channel state information (CSI) at the destination to minimize the outage probability.
The authors in Zhang et al. (2015) propose another scenario investigates the MISO channels
with power splitting scheme used by the legitimate receiver to split the received signal for both
information decoding and energy harvesting. Another power allocation method in Long et al.
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(2014) is analysed in which the source nodes should send jamming signals as a part of their
power instead of hiring extra nodes to jam the eavesdropper. Two types of jamming signals are
analysed; a priori known jamming signals at the source nodes, and unknown jamming signals
at the source nodes. A major ﬁnding reported in this work is that, if the jamming signals are
known a priori at the source nodes, the secrecy capacity is improved signiﬁcantly when com-
pared to the scenario in which the jamming signals are unknown at the source nodes. In Yang
et al. (2014), a linear precoding scheme is utilized at the base station, which exploits transmit
diversity by weighting the information stream, this is studied with the cooperative jamming
strategy. An optimal solution is obtained when the number of antennas at the friendly jammer
is no less than the total number at the eavesdropping antennas. The authors in Wang et al.
(2015a) propose a sequential parametric convex approximation (SPCA) based algorithms to
address the power allocation optimization and maximize the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) lower
bound, and then it is shown that the optimized power allocation tends to allocate more power
to the jamming signals to improve the secrecy capacity. An optimal relay selection criterion
and power allocation strategy are derived in Wang & Wang (2014) between the jamming sig-
nals and the conﬁdential information for the ESR maximization. Another study in Deng et al.
(2015) shows that a helper node should allocate its power as a jammer or as a helper depending
on the locations of the helper and the eavesdropper.
4.3 Jamming Policies
Several policies are proposed for relay selection Liu et al. (2015); Sun et al. (2015); Hui et al.
(2015). In Liu et al. (2015), four relay selection policies are proposed and compared, namely
random relay and random jammer, random jammer and best relay, best relay and best jammer,
and best relay and no jammer; and it characterizes the joint impact of the proposed relay se-
lection policies and the interference power constraint on the secrecy performance by deriving
new exact closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability; it is shown then that
the jammer’s absence gives rise to the outage saturation phenomenon. Two relay and jammer
selection methods are developed in Hui et al. (2015) for minimizing the secrecy outage prob-
ability; in both these selection methods, each intermediate node knows its own role while the
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knowledge of the jammer and relay set is kept secret from all the eavesdroppers. It is shown
that maintaining the privacy of the selection result improves greatly the secrecy outage proba-
bility performance. This work assumes a decode and forward relay system, in which the source
communicates with the destination through many intermediate nodes in the presence of several
passive eavesdroppers. The intermediate nodes act as either jammers or as conventional relays
to hinder the eavesdroppers from intercepting the signal of interest. The destination broadcasts
information that allows the intermediate nodes to determine whether they will serve as relays
or jammers, but this information does not allow the eavesdroppers to know the selection re-
sult. In Park et al. (2013), a scheme is provided which has a destination, relay and a source;
the destination starts to send jamming signals towards the eavesdropper while the source is
sending the message to the relay, and the destination then removes the jamming noise perfectly
via self-interference cancellation at the second phase. Another scheme in Liu et al. (2013)
is provided; in the ﬁrst phase, the source transmits the information bearing signal, simultane-
ously as it cooperates with the destination in jamming the eavesdropper without interference
at the relay. In the second phase, a relay is selected optimally, which transmits the decoded
source signal, at the same time, this relay cooperates with the source to jam the eavesdropper
without creating interference at the destination. The authors in Lin et al. (2013a) propose a
new transmission scheme, where the relaying group and the jamming group are constructed
together, this scheme enables to block the eavesdroppers simultaneously and further increase
the signal-to-noise ratio at the destination. In Chen et al. (2013), attack strategies are inves-
tigated in a multi-relay network that consists of both malicious and cooperative relays, where
the malicious relays are given the freedom to listen to the source in the ﬁrst phase (so that they
can send interfering signals in the second phase), or to directly emit jamming signals in both
phases. Subsequently, it is shown that the malicious relays should attack in both phases rather
than just listening in the ﬁrst phase and attack in the second phase. On the other hand, the
opportunistic cooperative jamming and the opportunistic relay chatting schemes are compared
in Ding et al. (2011). It is shown that the chatting scheme is better for implementing the relay
nodes to jam the eavesdropper in the both phases comparing with cooperative jamming scheme
in which only the eavesdropper jams in the ﬁrst phase.
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Moreover, jamming policies using game theory methods are proposed in Fakoorian & Swindle-
hurst (2013); Chen et al. (2013); Stanojev & Yener (2013); Li et al. (2014b). In Fakoo-
rian & Swindlehurst (2013), a scheme of two user multiple-input-single output Gaussian inter-
ference channel is considered, where each transmitter aims to maximize the difference between
its secrecy rate and the other’s secrecy rate, in this scheme, the weaker link tries to minimize
the extra secrecy rate of the other transmitter, while the transmitter with the stronger link tries
to maximize it. This paper uses Nash equilibrium strategy as a solution in its scheme. A
multi-relay network is considered in Chen et al. (2013) that consists of both malicious and
cooperative relays, and applies Nash equilibrium game strategy on its scheme, by modelling
the cooperative relays set and the malicious relays set as two players in a zero sum game with
the maximum achievable rate as the utility. The authors in Stanojev & Yener (2013) propose
another game-theoretic model, Stackelberg game, with the legitimate parties being spectrum
owners acting as a game leader, and the set of the assisting jammers which are constituting
the follower. It shows that when the potential jammers’ number increases, utility of a chosen
jammer for any scheme will start to decrease as the legitimate parties can be more aggressive
when leading the game. In Li et al. (2014b), a smart jammer can quickly learn the transmis-
sion strategies of the legitimate transmitters, then he would adjust his strategy to damage the
legitimate transmission. Meanwhile, the transmitters are aware of the existence of the smart
jammer. This anti-jamming scenario is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the leader is
the source node and the follower is the jammer. It is shown that the optimal power control
strategies obtained from the Stackelberg equilibrium game can decrease the damage caused by
the jammer.
5. Conclusion
Unlike its conventional applications, jamming techniques are used to enhance the security of
transmission in wireless communication networks. In this paper, we have surveyed the differ-
ent challenges related to the physical layer security in wireless networks and we developed a
literature review of the different jamming techniques within the existing recent literature with
their advantages and disadvantages.
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Based on this review we can conclude that there are still many issues to be resolved around
jamming techniques applications such as communication architectures for energy harvesting,
protocols, and interference management.
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1. Abstract
This paper studies the secrecy capacity scaling in an Amplify-and-Forward (AF) dual-phase
large network containing K relays. In our model, part of these K relays are assumed to be
potential eavesdroppers. Before transmitting the message in the ﬁrst phase, the multi-antennas
source divides it to partial messages and multicasts each part to a different disjoint sector.
During the second phase, the K relays use the distributed beamforming (DBF) technique to
retransmit the message to the destination. We investigate the ergodic secrecy capacity con-
sidering two different behaviours of the untrustworthy relays; the passive behaviour, when the
untrustworthy relays work separately from each other to intercept the signal, and the aggres-
sive one, when the untrusted relays collaborate to hijack the message. As demonstrated, our
location-based multicasting scenario is signiﬁcantly increasing the security compared to the
recent works that employ broadcasting schemes. Additionally, it also increases the secrecy ca-
pacity scaling remarkably. Finally, our analytical derivations are conﬁrmed by the simulation.
Keywords: Physical layer security, location-based multicasting, amplify and forward, dis-
tributed beamforming, secrecy capacity.
2. Introduction
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Over the last few years, security has always been considered a critical issue in wireless net-
works’ design. The vital concept of the secrecy capacity is built on whether increasing the
legitimate channel capacity or decreasing the capacity of the illegitimate channels, which is
attainable via the usage of the dynamic nature of the wireless channels Gopala et al. (2008).
Therefore, many contributions have been recently accomplished to escalate the secrecy capac-
ity by associating advanced techniques in wireless communications, such as multiple antenna
schemes, game theory techniques, beamforming and power allocation methods Atallah et al.
(2015). Wireless security appears to be a crucial matter in today’s communication systems as
both the diversity and the number of users in wireless networks keep growing. According to
these security challenges, leading researchers are seeking more information theoretical meth-
ods to accomplish almost perfect security in wireless channels. With this approach, consider-
able efforts have been made by authors in Gopala et al. (2008); Bloch et al. (2008) to develop
information-theoretical security, which raises the opportunity to have a secure communication
in an existence of eavesdroppers. The foundations of information-theoretic security were led
by Wyner (1975); Leung-Yan-Cheong & Hellman (1978). Obviously, many facts haven’t been
considered in this domain’s primal works, such as the wireless channels that are susceptible
to fading or that the communicating devices constitute networks out of unknown topology. A
few decades later, channel propagation effect has been considered in Gopala et al. (2008);
Bloch et al. (2008). In this direction, the authors in Gopala et al. (2008) investigated the se-
crecy capacity of wireless fading channels considering the channel state information (CSI). The
authors in Bloch et al. (2008) found the average secrecy capacity and the outage probability ex-
pressions of quasi-static fading channels for both the perfect and the imperfect CSI scenarios.
Considering random topologies, the secrecy capacity has been investigated in Haenggi (2008).
Following this direction, the researchers in Koyluoglu et al. (2012) studied the secrecy capacity
scaling laws. The secrecy capacity of unicast links with the existence of multiple wiretappers
was investigated in Vuppala & Abreu (2013), where the transmission to the k-th legitimate
node was based on the order of the distance between the source and the destination. Hence-
forth, relay aided transmission has been taken into consideration as an effective way to escalate
the transmission reliability, throughput and coverage probability in the literatureLaneman et al.
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(2004); Lin et al. (2014). Several strategies have been studied in literature for relay aided trans-
mission, particularly amplify and forward, decode and forward and demodulate and forward.
As the nature of the wireless medium previously explained, some of the relays could possibly
be eavesdroppers within the transmission area. In Kim et al. (2015), the secrecy capacity scal-
ing and the diversity order were calculated with the presence of potential passive eavesdroppers
with the destination-assisted jamming, in which the destination transmits jamming messages
to the relays. However, in Atallah & Kaddoum (2016), the authors went deeper to ﬁnd the ca-
pacity scaling in a worse scenario; the possibility that potential aggressive eavesdroppers could
cooperate together to intercept the received message.
In this paper, we introduce a new system model that remarkably improves the security, espe-
cially compared to the recent works Kim et al. (2015); Atallah & Kaddoum (2016). We propose
a two-hop AF relaying model. It is also assumed that the source divides its message to parts
and sends each part to a different directional antenna in which each element covers a disjoint
area. Whereas in the second phase, using the distributed beamforming technique (DBF), the
relays retransmit the received message towards the destination. This DBF method is proved to
be very efﬁcient compared to other methods like opportunistic relaying technique Kim et al.
(2015); Atallah & Kaddoum (2016). Again, we assume two types of relays, trustworthy and
untrustworthy. Two kinds of untrusted relays are studied; passive, where each relay tries to
intercept the message individually, and aggressive, where each untrustworthy relay sends its
received signal to a concurrent eavesdropper which in its turn aggregates the received signals
to decipher the message. The main contributions presented in this paper are ﬁnding the ergodic
secrecy capacity under location-based multicasting scenario in two cases:
- The potential untrustworthy relays are passive where they work apart to interpret the mes-
sage.
- The potential untrustworthy relays are aggressive by collaborating between each other to
hijack the message.
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Notations: X and E[X ] denote the mean expectation of a random variable (r.v.) X . Fur-
thermore, [A ]+ denotes max{A,0}. For a r.v. X , the notation X ∼Nc(a,b) denotes that X is
a complex Gaussian r.v. with mean a and variance b. X
w.p.1→ denotes the convergence with
probability 1.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure-A IV-1 System model. The source s sends its message to the
destination d by multicasting its partial signals in the ﬁrst hop, xs,l,xs,m and
xs,g, towards different sections L,M and G. In the second hop, the relays
retransmit the signals to the destination d using beamforming technique DBF
Consider a two-hop wireless network consisting of K relays with a destination d and a multi-
antennas source s. In our network, as shown in Fig. IV-1, each relay has a single antenna
operating in a half-duplex mode. In addition, we assume that there is no direct link between
the source s and the destination d, i.e. all the transmitted information must be forwarded by
relays.
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In our analysis, the channels are assumed to be reciprocal frequency-ﬂat block-fading with
the coefﬁcient between nodes i and j being denoted by hi, j and being modelled as a Gaussian
r.v. hi, j ∼ lnN (μi j,σ2i j) where (i, j ∈ {s,k,d}). The channel gains
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 and ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 are
independent and exponentially distributed r.v.’s. We assume that the noise variance N0 is the
same in the ﬁrst and the second phase, and the CSI is known by the receiving nodes. Instead of
broadcasting the message in the ﬁrst phase, the source will divide the signal into multiple parts
and multicast each part to a speciﬁed sector, as demonstrated in Fig. IV-1. Each section will
be denoted by the total number of the relays that it has. Without loss of generality, we study
the case where the source divides its message into three partial messages and sends them to
three different disjoint areas, due to the use of directional antennas. This given conﬁguration is
used to make the derivation easy to follow. Therefore, the general form of the secrecy capacity
using multicasting with many partial messages is given at the end of the analysis part. As
shown in Fig. IV-1, the ﬁrst, the second and the third sections will be denoted by L,M and G
respectively. We will use the same letters L,M and G to denote the total number of relays in its
corresponding section. Hence, K = L+M+G. We will also denote the partial message by xs,r,
when it is sent to the section R, where r ∈ {l,m,g}, R ∈ {L,M,G} and 1≤ r≤ R. The received
signal at the rth relay is expressed by
yr = hs,r
√
Ps,rxs,r+ns,r, (A IV-1)
where ns,r is a complex additive white Gaussian noise at the rth relay with zero mean and
variance N0. The transmitted powers of the source are denoted by Ps,r. It is assumed that at the
rth relay, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio SINR would be
γr = ρs,r |hs,r|2, (A IV-2)
where the signal to noise ratio is denoted by ρs,r
Δ
=Ps,r
/
N0, r ∈ {l,m,g}. We will assume that
the signal to noise ratios are equal ρ Δ=ρs,r, but the extension using different ρs,r values is
straightforward. In the following subsections, we will ﬁnd the secrecy capacity scaling for our
system in two cases; when there are untrusted relays trying to intercept their received messages
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individually, and when these untrusted relays work together to intercept the message. We will
later use L′,M′ and G′ to denote the total number of the untrustworthy aggressive relays in each
of L,M and G sectors respectively, where L> L′,M >M′ and G> G′.
4. Secrecy Capacity for Passive Untrustworthy relays
In this case, each untrustworthy passive relay works individually to intercept the received mes-
sage without any kind of cooperation with any other relays. The received SINR at any potential
untrusted passive relay would be given by
γk = ρs,k
∣∣hs,k∣∣2, (A IV-3)
Considering that each relay has just a part of the message, and that the message is already
encrypted in the upper layers before it is divided to partial messages, its interpretation is im-
possible considering the other parts are missing.
Using the distributed beamforming strategy DBF in the second phase, the retransmitted signal
by the rth relay is xr = ar yr . The normalized amplifying coefﬁcient ar for the rth relay is as
follows
ar =
1√
ρs,r |hs,r|2+N0
. (A IV-4)
However, the destination can receive a signal either from a trustworthy or untrustworthy relay.
The received signal at the destination, from a random relay, can be expressed as
yd= hr,dar yr+nd . (A IV-5)
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where nd is a complex additive white Gaussian noise AWGN with zero mean and variance N0
at the destination. The received SINR from the rth relay becomes
γr =
ρs,r |hs,r|2 ρr,d
∣∣hr,d∣∣2
ρs,r |hs,r|2+ρr,d
∣∣hr,d∣∣2+1 , (A IV-6)
for r ∈ {l,m,g}. The channel capacity from the source to the destination would be given by
Cd =
1
2
log
(
1+
L
∑
l=1
γl
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+
M
∑
m=1
γm
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+
G
∑
g=1
γg
)
. (A IV-7)
whereas Cw is the secrecy capacity between a potential untrusted passive relay and the source,
and it is given as follows
Cw =
1
2
log
(
1+max
k
(
ρs,k
∣∣hs,k∣∣2)) . (A IV-8)
We consider the maximum SINR in Eq. (A IV-8) to evaluate the worst case in which the
eavesdropper could obtain the maximum amount of information. From Eq.(A IV-7) and Eq.
(A IV-8), the ergodic secrecy capacity could be written as
CP = E {CP}
= E
{
[Cd−Cw]+
}
(a)
≥ [E {Cd}−E {Cw}]+, (A IV-9)
where CP is the instantaneous secrecy capacity.
(a) follows from Jensen’s inequality
E {max(X1,X2)} ≥ max(E {X1} ,E {X2}) . (A IV-10)
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For R→ ∞, γr in Eq.(A IV-6) satisﬁes the Kolmogorov conditions i.e.
R
∑
r=1
VAR [γr]
r2
< ∞, (A IV-11)
and
μr =
1
R
R
∑
r=1
E [γr]< ∞, (A IV-12)
are true for any ﬁnite ρ Bolcskei et al. (2006) where R ∈ {L,M,G}.
Thus, we can apply the following theorem [15, Theorem 1.8.D] :
R
∑
r=1
γr
R
−
R
∑
r=1
E [γr]
R
w.p.1→ 0. (A IV-13)
Therefore, γr
w.p.1→ Rμr and
E
{
1
2
log
(
1+
R
∑
r=1
γr
)}
∼ 1
2
log(R) . (A IV-14)
Fact 1: max
k
(
ρs,k
∣∣hs,k∣∣2) behaves like ρs,k log(K)+O (log log(K)) for K → ∞ and limited ρ
[16, Lemma 4].
From Fact 1 and Eq.(A IV-8), Cw will be as follows
Cw ∼ 12 loglog(K) . (A IV-15)
The secrecy capacity in Eq.(A IV-9) can be represented by
CP ≥ 12 log(L)+
1
2
log(M)+
1
2
log(G)− 1
2
loglog(K) ,
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CP 
1
2
log(LMG) . (A IV-16)
Since the relays are half-duplex, we use the rate-loss factor value of 1/2.
5. Aggressive Untrustworthy Relays
The aggressive untrustworthy relays are the relays that collaborate together by retransmitting
their received signals to a one wiretapper to decipher the message. The wiretapper could be
internal i.e. one of the relays, or external. In our scheme, we will assume that the wiretapper
e is external, as shown in Fig. IV-1. We will denote the total number of all the untrusted
aggressive relays in the network by U . We will assume that these untrusted aggressive relays
are distributed equally between all the sectors L,M and G. From Fig. IV-1, L′,M′ and G′
denote the total number of the untrustworthy aggressive relays in each of L,M and G sectors,
respectively.
The retransmitted signal from each untrusted aggressive relay towards the wiretapper e will be
denoted by yr′ where r′ ∈ {l′,m′,g′} . Hence, the received signal at the wiretapper e from each
of the untrustworthy aggressive relays would be
ye= hr′,ear′ yr′+ne, (A IV-17)
where hr′,e is the channel coefﬁcient between an untrustworthy relay and the wire-tapper, ne is
a complex AWGN with zero mean and variance N0 at the wire-tapper. The received SINR at
the wire-tapper becomes
γr′ =
ρs,r′
∣∣hs,r′∣∣2 ρr′,e ∣∣hr′,e∣∣2
ρs,r′
∣∣hs,r′∣∣2+ρr′,e ∣∣hr′,e∣∣2+1 , (A IV-18)
The instantaneous channel capacity at the wiretapper will be given by
Ce =
1
2
log
(
1+
L′
∑
l′=1
γl′
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+
M′
∑
m′=1
γm′
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+
G′
∑
g′=1
γg′
)
. (A IV-19)
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Consequently, the ergodic secrecy capacity with the presence of the aggressive relays could be
written as
CA = E {CA}= E
{
[Cd−Ce]+
}
(A IV-20)
(a)
≥ [E {Cd}−E {Ce}]+, (A IV-21)
where (a) follows from the fact that E {max(X1,X2)} ≥ max(E {X1} ,E {X2}). By applying
the steps followed for the Eq.(A IV-14) in the previous subsection, the secrecy capacity scaling
for untrusted aggressive relays will take the form
CA =
1
2
log(L)+
1
2
log(M)+
1
2
log(G)−
1
2
log
(
L′
)
+
1
2
log
(
M′
)
+
1
2
log
(
G′
)
=
1
2
log(LMG)− 1
2
log
(
L′M′G′
)
CA =
1
2
log
(
LMG
L′M′G′
)
, (A IV-22)
Without loss of generality, we will assume that
K
U
=
L
L′
=
M
M′
=
G
G′
= T. (A IV-23)
By compensating Eq.(A IV-23) in Eq.(A IV-22), the secrecy capacity would be
CA =
1
2
log
(
T 3
)
. (A IV-24)
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Then, by generalizing Eq.(A IV-24) to multicast V partial messages towards V different sec-
tions instead of three, the secrecy capacity scaling will be expressed as
CA =
1
2
log
(
TV
)
=
V
2
log(T ) , (A IV-25)
CA =
V
2
log
(
K
U
)
. (A IV-26)
6. Simulation results
0 50 100 150 200
100
Number  of Relays K
Er
go
di
c 
se
cr
ec
y 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 [b
ps
\H
z]
Chan. capacity sim; Multicasting on trusted relays
Sec. capacity sim; Multicasting on untrusted aggr. relays
Chan. capacity sim; Broadcasting on trusted relays
Sec. capacity sim; Broadcasting on untrusted aggr. relays
Figure-A IV-2 Ergodic secrecy capacity: ρ Δ=ρs,k = ρk,d = ρk,e = 5dB,∣∣hs,k∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,e∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 = 1 and U = 13K
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Figure-A IV-3 Ergodic secrecy capacity when using Location-Besed
Multicasting technique with the presence of untrusted aggressive relays for
different values of V which is identiﬁed in Eq.(A IV-26):
ρ Δ=ρs,k = ρk,d = ρk,e = 5dB,
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,e∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 = 1 and U = 13K
Assuming that ρ Δ=ρs,k = ρk,d = ρk,e = 5dB,
∣∣hs,k∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,e∣∣2 = ∣∣hk,d∣∣2 = 1 and U = 13K, in
Fig.IV-2, we do the performance comparison between our scenario, where the source multicasts
each part of the message, and the other scenarios, from recent studies, in which the source just
broadcasts the signal Kim et al. (2015); Atallah & Kaddoum (2016). The results, which are
simulated in Matlab, show the improvement in the secrecy capacity of our scenario compared
to the broadcasting one. For the passive untrusted relays’ case, considering that the message
is already encrypted in the upper layers before dividing it to partial messages, the secrecy
capacity is not affected as long as the eavesdroppers cannot have an access to the other parts
of the message, which gives a lot of enhancements in the security perspective and eliminates
the need for some of the other security solutions like cooperative jamming. On the other hand,
for aggressive eavesdroppers cooperating between each other to assemble the message’s parts,
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the secrecy capacity is considerably enhanced a lot, as a result of ameliorating the channel
capacity from 12 log(K) =
1
2 log(L+M+G) in Kim et al. (2015),Atallah & Kaddoum (2016)
to 12 log(LMG) as shown in our study. In Fig.3.4, we simulate the ergodic secrecy capacity
with the presence of untrustworthy aggressive relays when V , identiﬁed in Eq.(A IV-26), takes
the values 3,6 and 9. As shown in Fig.3.4, the more we multicast partial messages towards
different sectors, the more the security is enhanced in our network.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy capacity scaling in large networks within two
contrasting roles of potential eavesdroppers; the passive and the aggressive one. We showed
that using our location-based multicasting technique will not only increase the secrecy capacity
in the presence of the aggressive relays, but prohibit the individual attempts, by passive eaves-
droppers to intercept the message as well. In addition, our proposed scheme is less energy
consuming compared to some techniques in physical layer security like cooperative jamming
methods. Besides, it does not need complicated calculations or advanced security algorithms,
which opens the door for it to be applied in Internet of Things world.
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